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Abstract

THE IMPACT OF SINCERITY OF TERRORISTS ON COMMITTING TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES IN TURKEY
By Ahmet Turer, Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2012
Dissertation Chair:
This study explores the impact of sincerity of terrorists on committing terrorist activities
in Turkey. The researcher is a Chief of Police in Turkey and has worked in the Anti-terror
Department for a considerable part of his professional career. His professional experience has
shown that the more sincere a terrorist is the more violent or heedless the terrorist activity is.
Thus this research academically and statistically examines this observation and finds that
sincerity affects level of violence. Attachment and adherence to the terrorist organization turn
even the characteristically non-violent people into blood seeking terrorists.

viii

Chapter 1

Introduction

Terrorism
Although terrorism became a popular subject and topic of academic interest after the
incident of 9/11 in the U.S., the concept of terrorism is neither new nor a diminishing topic of
public and professional attention of the Turkish government and Turkish National Police. Turkey
has suffered immensely from terrorism over the last couple of decades, however understanding
the dynamics of terrorism has not been of much academic concern in Turkey as opposed to
fighting it through government forces. Academic studies in Turkey on terrorism limited both in
number and scope mainly focused on reasons of terrorism, the relationship between socio
economic dynamics and terrorism, the impact of migration on terrorism and finance of terrorism.
However understanding the motives of terrorism and terrorist actions on an individual level is
crucial in solving the equation. Thus, this research focuses on one of the important and yet
unexplored territories within the domain of terrorism: the impact of sincerity.
There are many reasons for becoming a member of a terrorist organization and just like in
any other crime motive is a key element in understanding the recruitment of a terrorist to its
organization. This chapter provides a general overview of the terrorism problem in Turkey.
Specifically, historical and theoretical backgrounds of terrorism concerning sincerity and its
relationship to violence of terrorism will be addressed in two sections. In the first section,
introductory information about terrorism and its history will be presented. In the second section
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theories that explain sincerity and its relationship to crime and terrorism are examined.
Terrorism in Turkey
Turkey came to face the terrorism problem full force during the 1970s. Starting in the
1960s, Turkey was affected by terrorist activities of mainly leftist groups, which emerged in part
as the result of resurgence of terrorism in Europe (Laqueur, 1999). Extremist left-wing
ideologists began to commit terrorist activities after the dramatic failure of the Socialist Turkish
Labor Party in the election of 1969, which resulted in public disorder and strikes.
The government was unable to prevent the disorder in the country and lost control. In
1960, the armed forces took control over by declaring martial law. Military power ruled the
government for an eighteen month period and civil rule was restored in 1961 (Bal & Laçiner,
2001). Laqueuer (1999, p. 31) explains that the root causes of Turkish terrorism was due to the
rapid urbanization and the resulting unequal distribution of economic resources. This leftist
movement received support from Bulgaria and the eastern bloc countries. The right used
religious institutions for the same purpose. During 1978 and 1979, 2,400 political murders had
been committed. The military took the power over again in 1980 to restore order within the
country (Laqueur, 1999).
In late 70’s another face of terrorism demanding separation of south east of Turkey
appeared using Kurdish population of Turkey. This was mainly in the non-urban areas (Laqueur,
1999). The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) was a militant, separatist organization that aimed to
create an independent Kurdish state in the southeastern part of Anatolia (Button, 1995).
Although Turkish authorities have argued that there is no Kurdish problem in Turkey, Kurds
have vigorously demanded more cultural, linguistic, and political rights. However, the reality
shows that citizens of Kurdish ethnic heritage enjoy full rights as Turkish citizens (Ahmed &
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Gunter, 2000; Keyman, 2007; Kirisci & Winrow, 1997; Lytle, 1977; MacDonald & O'Leary,
2007; Taspinar, 2005).
Terrorist acts have also been committed by extremist religious groups. Such groups have
been trying to change the secular Kemalist reforms and replace a secular, constitutional Turkish
state with an Islamic Sharia based state following the Iranian model (Laqueur, 1999). These
groups enjoyed wide Iranian support and often acted on behalf of Iranian local and regional,
political and strategic interests. The reaction of Turkish authorities in the past to Islamic terrorist
activity was limited and thus encouraged leaders of these groups and their sponsors to continue
escalating violence hoping it will bring down the secular democratic regime in Turkey. In
Turkey and by many observers abroad, the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) has been considered
as the main threat to the Turkish state's national unity and defense.
The Islamic terrorist activity in Turkey dates back to 1960s. As early as 1967 and 1973
the leaders of Hizb-al-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party) were captured for attempting to bring the
Islamic State Constitution to Turkey. Islamic Jihad emerged as a real terrorist threat in the
1980s, following a series of assassinations against Jordanian, Saudi and Iraqi diplomats. In
October 1991, Islamic Jihad took responsibility for murdering an American military officer and
wounding an Egyptian diplomat in order to protest the Middle East peace conference held in
Madrid. For many years, it was thought that this organization was a Lebanese Shiite terrorist
group, however it was later discovered that a functioning Turkish branch existed, engaging in
terrorist activities.
A report by the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Security
General Directorate of the Police in October 1991 mentions at least ten Islamic organizations that
are active in Turkey: Turkish Islamic Liberation Army (IKO), Turkish Islamic Liberation Front

3

(TIK-C), Fighters of the Islamic Revolution (IDAM), Turkish Islamic Liberation Union (TIKB),
World Sharia Liberation Army (DSKO), Universal Brotherhood Front-Sharia Revenge Squad
(EKC-SIM), Islamic Liberation Party Front (IKP-C), Turkish Fighters of the Universal Islamic
War of Liberation (EIK-TM), Turkish Islamic Fighters Army (IMO) and Turkish Sharia
Revenge Commandos (TSIK).
Purpose of the Study
This study examine terrorism in Turkey in order to determine whether a relationship
exists between sincerity of the members of various terrorist groups and the level of violence
demonstrated in their activities. The sincerity of the members of terrorist groups is defined here
as their willingness to stay within the organization for reasons other than economical and
sociological considerations. This study attempts to analyze the membership process of terrorists
by studying three different types of terrorist organizations, a leftist, a separatist and a religiously
inspired. All organizations analyzed in this study are well known and have been recognized as
terrorist organizations by the international bodies including the UN, the EU, and the US State
Department.
The first terrorist organization is the DHKP/C, a leftist terrorist organization in Turkey,
which is at the same time one of the only two active leftist terrorist organizations in Europe. The
second is the PKK, an ethnic terrorist organization based in the eastern part of Turkey and
Northern Iraq, and is also active in Europe. The last group of terrorist organizations are the
radical Islamic groups namely Al-Qaeda, Hizb-urTahrir, and IBDA-CE which are active mostly
all over Turkey. These organizations have members and activities all over Turkey and though
they can be selective in terms of what they target and in terms of the modus operandi of their
actions, they are all considered within the definition of law as terrorist organizations and their
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actions as terrorism.
In the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (April 12th, 1991) terrorism is defined as follows:
"Terror refers to all kinds of activities attempted by a member or members of an organization for
the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which is stated in the constitution,
and the political, jurisdictional, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial
integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining or invading the
authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of
Turkish government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security”
(TurkishGovernment, 1991).
Counter Terrorism Department and Intelligence Department within Turkish National
Police, distinguish three categories of terrorist groups: (1) Leftist Terrorist Organizations – most
of these groups fall into Marxist-Leninist groups; (2) Separatist Groups – primarily PKK and its
sub groups fall into this category; (3) Religiously Motivated Terrorist Groups – these groups
include Turkish Hezbollah, IBDA-CE, Hizb-urTahrir, and Al-Qaeda.
Theoretical Framework
Terrorism is a crime. Like many other crimes, terrorism involves deviant behavior, which
can be explained by various criminological theories. It is the author’s view that a single theory is
not capable of providing an adequate explanation of terrorism. Terrorism is a multi dimensional
phenomenon. Firstly, it is a social and cultural problem. Most terrorist conflicts arise from ethnic
and heritage based conflicts. Secondly, regardless of ethnicity or social status, ideological
dynamics play a role behind terrorism. Lastly, terrorism is simply as in the case of state
terrorism. At the bottom line, terrorism involves an organized group of individuals acting
towards a particular cause. Issues of ideological base, leadership, recruitment and retention of
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members should be addressed in the research along with questions regarding commitment of
criminal activities of these groups. In light of this view a number of criminological theories have
been reviewed in the following paragraphs as they relate to the phenomenon of terrorism.
Social Disorganization Theory explains the observed relationship between inequality and
crime. This theory was first developed by Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay in 1942, striving to
explain urban crime and deviance. The most significant finding of their study was that the rate of
delinquency in the lower class neighborhoods was highest near the inner city and decreased as
you moved toward the more affluent areas (Akers & Sellers, 2009; Messner & Golden, 1992). It
has been concluded that communities lacking in social capital are less effective in applying
social control to reduce violence as compared to communities with higher levels of social capital
(Robert J. Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 2003).
Social Disorganization Theory explains that low economic status; high levels of
racial/ethnic heterogeneity and residential mobility affect the community’s level of social
disorganization (Shaw & McKay, 2003). The areas in which Shaw & McKay (2003) found high
delinquent rates are characterized by poor housing, physical decay, incomplete and broken
families, high rates of illegitimate births, and an unstable population. Comparing low and high
socioeconomic communities they found low socioeconomic status communities suffer from a
weaker organizational base than higher status communities. Therefore these communities have
less ability to engage in both social control and the appropriate socialization of their residents (R.
J. Sampson & Groves, 1989).
They suggest that social disorganization is the result of these characteristics which
undermine informal social controls within the community and are directly related to high crime
rates as opposed to urban ecology, depressed economic conditions, or rapid social changes
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(Bursik, 1988).
Anomie Strain Theory owes much to Emile Durkheim who first used the term “anomie”
to refer to a lack of social regulation that promotes higher rates of suicide (Akers, 2000). By
identifying inequality as a causal factor in crime, Merton (1938) made the first significant
contribution to the inequality literature. His hypothesis states that “crime is a symptom of specific
sort of social disorganization: the unequal distribution of means of success in society necessary
to achieve “the American dream”. He explains that inequality of opportunity creates situations in
which certain individuals engage in crime, in order to achieve culturally defined success.
Anomie is the form that societal maladjustment takes when individuals seek levels of success
that are not consistent with socially available means. In such conditions individuals may
experience strain. This strain creates pressure as people attempt to succeed in an environment
with limited opportunities. This lack of socially acceptable opportunities may push those
individuals towards crime. Merton uses the concept of the American dream to help explain his
theory. He states that the American dream promotes the idea that equal opportunity and therefore
success is available to all. However, the reality is quite different as equal opportunity to achieve
success is not available to all. For example, disadvantaged minority groups and the lower class
do not have the same access to such legitimate opportunities (Akers, 2000).
Merton (1938) identified five types of adaptation to strain. He described “Conformity” or
an attempt to strive for success within the restricted conventional means available. He named the
most common deviant response, “Innovation”. In this form of behavior one maintains a
commitment to success goals but takes advantage of illegitimate means to attain them. A third
response, “Rebellion” rejects the system altogether, both means and ends, and tries to replaces it
with a new one. Finally, “Retreat” result when one gives up on both the success goals and the
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effort to achieve them. In “Ritualism” one gives up the struggle to get ahead and concentrates
only on retaining what little has been gained. This is accomplished in part by adhering strongly
and zealously to the norms. This response is often produced by the disjuncture between society’s
promise of equality and success and the actual inequalities in the distribution of opportunities.
This inequality is most severe for members of the lower class, the disadvantaged, and minority
groups.
Following the school of strain and normlessness further studies have been made. For
instance, the General Strain Theory (GST) is a modified version of earlier strain theories
(Cloward & Ohlin, 2003; A. K. Cohen, 2003; Merton, 1938), which argue that criminal behavior
results from the structurally-induced gap between aspirations and expectations. Encompassing
and expanding the classical Mertonian view of strain and delinquency, GST focuses on negative
relationships (e.g., poor academics, failed romantic relationships, financial crisis, interpersonal
violence, job loss, etc.) from a social psychological view (Agnew, 1985; Agnew & White, 1992).
While retaining the original concept of strain by Merton (1938), the revised theory posits three
types of strain: the failure to achieve positively valued goals, the removal of positively valued
goals, and the presentation of noxious stimuli.
The addition of the new types of strain addresses some of the noteworthy weaknesses of
Merton’s (1938) strain theory, which include “criminal and delinquent behaviors that are
spontaneous, violent and emotionally-charged, and of which social structure is not a foundational
factor” (Vegh, 2011, p. 17). Agnew’s perception of strain (1985, 1987, 2006) allows for a wider
application of the theory on criminal and delinquent acts, such as substance use, traffic
violations, juvenile crime, and violence related crimes (i.e. terrorism).
Marxist Theory tends to refer more to the control by the system than to the behavior
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(Akers, 2000, p. 195). The first systematic application of Marxism to the crime discourse was
introduced by Dutch criminologist Willem Bonger (1887-1940) who hypothesized that crime is
produced by the “capitalist organization of society”(Bonger, 1916). Marxist theory hypothesizes
that both the number and types of crime in a society are produced by the fundamental conditions
of capitalism. With the maximization of profit as its central goal, capitalism promotes
competition and individualism to the detriment of cooperation and is harmful to the community
(Bohm, 1985; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2003). According to Bohm (1985), self-interest and
competition are not limited to the working classes but can influence all members of a capitalist
society and thus set up conditions conducive to criminal behavior among all classes.
According to Marxist theory, capitalism has a ruling class that dominates the proletariat.
The latter has the majority of members but nothing to sell except their labor. But the ruling class,
on the other hand, has the political power because the capitalists’ monopoly gives them that
power. This power allows them to manipulate the legal and the criminal justice system to
promote their interests and to maintain power. The masses of workers have no power to help
establish their domination. Their only choice is to bring down the government and destroy the
capitalist economy (Akers, 2000).
The introduction of rational choice theory to the study of terrorism has had enormous
consequences. Among other things, it has ended with the sort of “methodological
exceptionalism” that was endemic in the field. Terrorism can be studied like any other social
phenomenon. The strategic interaction between TOs and the state cries out for game theory
modeling. Likewise, the relationship between the terrorist organization and its supporters, the
choice of terrorist tactics (including suicide missions) or the constraints that affect TOs are issues
that can be analyzed with rational choice instruments. Rational choice theory has also been used
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to propose counterterrorist policy recommendations (Frey & Luechinger, 2002).
Rational choice theory holds that people will engage in crime after weighing the costs
and benefits of their actions to arrive at a rational choice about motivation after perceiving that
the chances of gain outweigh any possible punishment or loss. Criminals must come to believe
their actions will be beneficial to themselves, their community, or society, and they must come to
see that crime pays, or is at least a risk-free way to better their situation(Hagan, 2011). Perhaps
the most well-known version of this idea in criminology is routine activities theory (L. E. Cohen
& Felson, 1979), which postulates that three conditions must be present in order for a crime to
occur: (1) suitable targets or victims who put themselves at risk; (2) the absence of capable
guardians or police presence; and (3) motivated offenders or a pool of the unemployed and
alienated. Other rational choice theories exist which delve further into models of decision
making. In the few models of collective violence that have found their way into criminology,
the Olson (1971)hypothesis suggests that participants in revolutionary violence predicate their
behavior on a rational cost-benefit calculus to pursue the best course of action given the social
circumstances.
Rational choice theory, in political science, follows a similar line, and holds that people
can be collectively rational, even when making what appears to be irrational decisions for them
as individuals, after perceiving that their participation is important and their personal
contribution to the public good outweighs any concerns they may have for the "free rider"
problem (Muller & Opp, 1986).
Terrorism is not a pathological phenomenon. The resort to terrorism is not an
aberration. The central focus of study ought to be on why some groups find terrorism useful, and
in standard control theory fashion, why other groups do not find terrorism useful. Some groups
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may continue to work with established patterns of dissident action. Other groups may resort to
terrorism because they have tried other alternatives. Still other groups may choose terrorism as
an early choice because they have learned from the experiences of others, usually through the
news media. Crenshaw (1998) calls this the contagion effect, and claims it has distinctive
patterns similar to the copycat effect as in other theories of collective violence (Gurr,
1970). There may be circumstances in which a terrorist group wants to publicize its cause to the
world – a process Crenshaw (1995) calls the globalization of civil war.
Factors that influence the rational choice of terrorism include place, size, time, and the
climate of international opinion. A terrorist plot in a democratic society is less likely to involve
senseless violence than a scheme hatched under an authoritarian regime because under the latter,
terrorists realize they have nothing to lose with the expected repercussions. Size is important
because a small elite group is more likely to resort to terrorism when the population is
passive. This means that more senseless acts of violence may occur in a stable society rather
than in one on the verge of collapse. Time constraints are important because the terrorist group
may be competing with other groups or attempting to manage a tit-for-tat strategy with
counterterrorism. The climate of international opinion, if low for the problems of the host
country, may force terrorists to take action that risks a repressive counterterrorist reaction, in
hopes that their suffering will capture public attention. In short, terrorism is an excellent tool for
managing the political agenda on a world stage.
The study of terrorism through the perspective of rational choice theory is still in its early
stages. In recent years, a number of talented modelers have started to apply the analytical
instruments of rational choice theory to explain terrorism. Along with that, it is reasonable to
expect many other similar contributions in near future. The field is now under deep
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transformation. Probably the definitive implosion will take place when formal models become
integrated with empirical, comparative research.
This study will integrate different criminological theories in explaining the research
question. Different theories explain different aspects of criminal behavior.
Research Question
The researcher uses secondary data analysis; data for sincerity level, violence level, and
demographic and economic variable. The data have been derived from the testimonial statements
of terrorist group members at Turkish National Police’s database.
Does the sincerity / fidelity of the terrorists have any impact on committing terrorist
activities?
Following the main research question, this study also explores whether socio-economic
status has any impact on recruitment and level of activities engaged in by the terrorists. And the
question of whether ethnic and religious affiliation matter in level of violence exerted by
terrorists is also explored.
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Chapter 2

Literature Review

Introduction
In an emergent study, data collection stage starts as soon as you have a research
situation. You can then access literature as it becomes relevant. Glaser (1978) makes much of
the prior background reading which provides the models to help make sense of the data. He
recommends reading widely while avoiding the literature most closely related to what you are
researching, because your reading may otherwise constrain your coding and memoing.
Following this suggestion, an extensive review of literature on terrorism has been done
by the researcher. However, the terrorist groups and their ideas within the specific country
described in this study are not well known in the literature. For that reason, each group and
current situation of that specific group is explained in general.
Defining Terrorism
While one person can describe someone or a group as a terrorist, the other can describe
them as freedom fighters (Ganor, 2002; Larabee, 2011; Saul, 2005; Sorel, 2003; Tripathy, 2010).
This dilemma helps explain why terrorism does not have a single definition. This is a major
problem in defining terrorism, and effects in the ongoing study and development of policies
needed to respond to terrorism. Terrorism is a widespread problem, which threatens the modern
world. It is a disease that attacks regardless of nation, religion, language, race and sect and kills
innocent people in a way that cannot be justified by any religious, political, or ideological
doctrine. Today no nation in our modern world can consider it self-safe against terrorism.
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International and national terrorism have gained their places in the world literature as the most
basic and up-to-date concepts of the post-Cold War period. Unfortunately, terrorism is not only
threatening the lives and safety of citizens in countries where it spreads violence, but it also
causes serious harm to the economy and politics of the related countries. Moreover, it may also
create conflicts between the public and the state because of the security measures taken to
combat terrorism.
The word “terror” has a Latin origin, and it was first used in its current form during the
French Revolution. The term “terror” that we use today is derived from the Latin word “terrere”
which refers to be filled with fear, to tremble with fear (Kaplan, 2011). The word “terrere” is
derived from “tre”, which means to tremble in Latin. The word “terrorism” was first used in
1795, just after the French Revolution with the meaning “intimidation by state by means of
creating fear,” and it was used as “terrrorisme” in France. The concept of terrorism was
introduced to the world literature by the British in 1798 and was regarded as “the systematic use
of terror.” The term “terrorist” in its modern meaning was first used in 1947 referring to the
tactics used by the Jews against the British on Palestinian territory. In addition, the word
“terrorist” was used for the Revolutionists in Russia in 1866 and for the radicals and reformists,
who were called the “Jacobins,” during the French Revolution in 1790s (Reitan, 2010).
The problem of defining terrorism is the main element in the fight against terrorism both
in international and national terms. Although there have been various definitions of terrorism, the
most frequently used definition contains two basic elements: use of violence and the desire to
change the political system. Politicians, academicians, security experts, journalists and
government representatives use various kinds of definitions in order to identify terrorism. While
the definition of terrorism set forth by the governments is different from that of the scholars, it
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may also differ between different state institutions. For instance, the United States has been very
cautious while defining terrorism so as not to include the IRA organization. The USA did not
include the IRA for many years in the list of terrorist groups throughout the world, which is
declared every year. The underlying reason for this is thought to be that there are around 50
million US citizens with Irish nationality living in the country. Only lately, the IRA was included
in the list of terrorist groups declared by the United States in the year 2000. However, the USA
felt the necessity of making an explanation and stated the name of the organization as “the real
IRA”. As this example illustrates, it seems difficult to attain a general definition of terrorism as
of today. However, it depends on us to regard this difficulty as richness and to take advantage of
this variety of definitions. In most basic terms, terrorism is the use of force with violence and
threats in order to change the political system. Terrorism is a threat, a method of fighting or a
strategy to achieve a particular target that absolutely includes use of “violence”. It aims at
creating fear in the public by means of merciless and inhuman methods.
If we have a look at the definitions throughout the world, despite the fact that we face
various and very different definitions, there are many common points. For instance, in the
Encyclopedia Britannica, terrorism is explained as “terror, resorting to systematic violence acts
against public or individuals with the aim to achieve a political target” (Terrorism, 2004).
In the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (April 12th, 1991) terrorism is defined as follows:
"Terror is all kinds of activities attempted by a member or members of an organization for the
purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which is stated in the constitution, and
the political, jurisdictional, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity
of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining or invading the authority of
the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish
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government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security” ( Law of Terror
Prevention,1991,p,1).
The definition of the U.N is that "‘Terrorism’ means any act of violence or threat thereof
notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective
criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their
lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or
private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or
international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or
sovereignty of independent States” (Freezing Funds, 2003).
In the British Anti-Terrorism Act (Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989) it is stated, "terrorism is
the use of violence for political ends (including) any use of violence for the purpose of putting
the public, or any section of the public in fear"(Prevention of Terrorism, 1989). On the other
hand, France defines terrorism as “an act by an individual or group that uses intimidation or
terror to disrupt public order" (How five foreign countries, 2000). Moreover, “In Germany,
terrorism has been described as an enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are
intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially
by means of severe crimes” (Martin, 2002).
The FBI’s definition of terrorism is “the unlawful use of force or violence against
persons, or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Terrorism in the United States,
1997). In addition, according to the definition formulated by the US, “ terrorism is any violence
perpetrated for political reasons by sub national groups or secret state agents, often directed at
noncombatant targets, and usually intended to influence an audience” (Terrorism and America,
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1998).
Different governments have different definitions. Likewise, different federal institutions
have their own definitions of terror. For instance, the definition used by the FBI is different from
that of the U.S. State Department. According to the definition of the FBI, individuals, as well as
groups, have the possibility to carry out terrorist actions. In addition to political aims, the FBI
includes social aims as well. However, the U.S State Department’s definition comes from its
own field.
As it can be understood from all these definitions, the element of “violence” has a
dominant role. Violence is the most common characteristic in all the definitions stated above.
Just as we have listed the definitions here, Alex P. Schmid has made a study of about 120
different definitions of terror in his book titled Political Violence. He has tried to figure out the
common points in the definitions and reach a general assessment. According to the results of this
research, violence and use of force have been the most common element appearing in about 90%
of the 120 definitions. Therefore, violence and the use of force turn out to be the element
accepted in most general terms. After violence, ideological or political aim appears in 65%, and
concepts such as fear, threat, or psychological impact are third following the ideological or
political aim. As a result, from all these studies and generally accepted definitions, it can be
concluded that in general terms terror is: “all kinds of actions performed by a group and include
violence and ideological/political aim” (Schmid, 1988). In light of the professional experience of
the author, terrorism can also be defined as “all kinds of actions, not necessarily destructive or
violent and even when within the limits of law, that are performed with the motives of
ideological and or political gains via intimidation and organized activity”.
Today, one of the most important bases of democratic societies is the non-governmental
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organization. By means of these non-governmental structures, not only does the public find the
opportunity to express itself, but also people can transmit their wishes to the political authorities,
hence ensuring development of democracy. Non-governmental organizations carry out their
activities to attain their demands only within a legal framework, and they never resort to
violence. This is the clearest particularity that differentiates between non-governmental
organizations and terrorist organizations. Although there are some similarities between terrorist
organizations and non-governmental organizations in terms of structure and aim, the most
significant characteristic of terrorist organizations is the fact that they take violence as the basis
in achieving their goals.
In conclusion, although there are more than a hundred of different definitions of terrorism
throughout the world made by states, international institutions, or scientists, and although each
one of these definitions seems to be different, there are two main elements in nearly all of the
said definitions: violence and use of force.
Violence and Use of Force
The goal of achieving an ideological change in the order is a result of this violence and
use of force.
Therefore, violence and use of force has taken its place in the world of terror literature as
the most significant element. As a result, today, it cannot be right to regard actions which do not
include violence as terror; moreover, countries declaring an organization as a terrorist
organization in the international arena must be certain that this organization uses violence and
force. If not, it is not a terrorist organization.
In addition, the definition of terrorist differs among the governments. For example, the
U.S. government considers all terrorists as criminals, whatever their ethnic, religious, or other
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affiliations are. (Terrorism in the United States, 1997). On the other hand, The Turkish Law of
Terror Prevention (12.04.1991) first defines the terrorism as following:
"Terrorism is all kinds of activities to be attempted by a member or members of an
organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which are
stated in the constitution, and the political, legal, social, secular, economic system,
destroying the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people,
weakening or ruining or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights
and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish government and Republic, destroying
the public order or peace and security (Official Gazzette, 1991)."
In the second article of the Law, referring to the first article, terrorist is defined as being a
member of an organization which is aiming to realize the goals referred in the first article and to
commit crimes for those ends (Official Gazzette, 1991). In short, a terrorist could be defined as a
person who is a member of a terrorist organization and commits crime for the goals of that
organization.
Characteristics of Terrorism
An unclear problem makes the solutions addressing that problem insufficient. In this
regard, general characteristics of terrorism will be examined to better acknowledge the facts of
terrorism. These characteristics are rather general and examples are provided from real life
terrorist organizations or independence movements where appropriate.
Violence
Terrorists apply extreme random violence including brutal and cruel methods of violent
activities, such as mass bombings and mass killings against the innocent. Their tactics mostly
involve violent activities such as assassination, explosions, kidnapping, hijacking, suicide
bombers, ambushes, and raids. Terrorists are also usually successful in their attacks as the targets
are unaware of their plans. Terrorist violence is generally well-planned and organized through a
chain of command.
Individual violent activities would not qualify as terrorism. In this regard, Hoffman
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(1998) states that an incident to qualify as terrorism must involve violence and must be
perpetrated by an organization which has conspiratorial political goals and an existing chain of
command beyond a single individual act on somebody’s own (Hoffmann, 1998).
Political and Ideological Agendas
Many agree that terrorism uses violence as a strategy to achieve certain goals. Those who
oppose existing governments can use violence, or people who want to maintain existing power
can use it. Terrorism is a means of insurrection that can be used by people of different political
convictions to gain political goals (Reitan, 2010).
Attaining a political goal is a significant and consistent concept used for defining
terrorism. These political goals set terrorist acts apart from criminal acts. Politically motivated
terrorism involves a deeply held sense of grievance over some form of social or economic
injustice. Modern terrorist organizations justify their actions not only with stated political aims
but also by appeals to some higher universal truth and the demand for political transformation
(Kassimeris, 2008).
Terrorism always has a political agenda. This agenda may be motivated by various
ideologies like Marxism, ethnical motivations or radical religious ideas. Terrorist organizations
manage to survive because of the ideological motivations and support they have. Terrorist
organizations break generally accepted norms or codes of behaviors of the society in pursuit of
their political gains. Hoffman (1998), in his book Inside Terrorism, describes terrorism as
fundamentally and inherently “political.” He argues that terrorism is “ineluctably about power:
the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change.
Terrorism is thus violence – or, equally important, the threat of violence – used and directed in
pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim” (p.2).
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If the terrorist organizations did not represent any ideology, their violence would be on
the level of organized crime, and their main purpose would be monetary gain. If the terrorist
organizations did not fight for the sake of a political aim, it would be impossible for those
organizations to find members and to get support from their followers. However, all of the
terrorist organizations have their own ideologies, and they seek support from the believers by
saying that they are fighting for the benefit of their ideology.
Also, the lack of opportunity for political participation regardless of the ideology would
eventually create motivation for terrorism. Regimes that deny access to political participation
create dissatisfaction and frustration in the denied group by forming discrimination. This
discrimination might eventually become a terrorist movement if the authorities keep denying
access to political participation (Whittaker, 2003).
Effects of Terrorist Violence

Extremists always thrive on insatiability. In such revolutionary situations, the terrorists
usually win (Frey & Luechinger, 2002). Psychological, economical, diplomatic, strategic and
political consequences of the violence are more prominent than the attacks and incidents the
terrorists are carrying out (Crenshaw, 1998, 1995). Short term effects of terrorism would involve
an immediate psychological effect on the society including fear and vulnerability, whereas the
long term effects would involve many potential political, ecological and/or economical
outcomes. In fact, the consequences of terrorism tend to have a higher rank in the scale of the
values (Chomsky & Achcar, 2002). The far-reaching effects of terrorism are quite clear from the
recent September 11th attacks. The cost of the September 11th attacks exceeds one hundred
billion dollars in the short term and in the long term the price tag is estimated around two trillion
dollars (IAGS, 2004). Certainly, the direct effect of the terrorism is on the immediate victims
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who got killed or wounded because of the terrorist activity (whether the victim was the direct
target or happened to be a bystander). Then the close family circles of the victims suffer from the
very immediate consequences of terror by losing their loved ones or by seeing the victims
wounded.
This circle expands as the events are brought to the public attention by the media. As the
terrorist events carry on, everybody in the society begins to feel the effect of terrorism. People
begin to worry about their own life and suffer psychologically because of terror.
Terrorism also affects the economy for a variety of reasons: business interruptions
because of the attacks, the loss of trust to the stability of international business which in turn
causes a loss or decline of, and loss of tourism revenue as people are usually reluctant to spend
their vacations where there are some serious concerns. An example of this would be the United
States travel warnings for travelers to Turkey. After two synagogue bombings in Istanbul at the
end of 2003, the U.S. State Department issued a travel advisory and asked its citizens not to
travel to Turkey which was reversed on March 22nd 2004.
Another example of economic effect comes from the U.S. following the September 11th
attacks, American Transportation Policy by R. Dilger (2002) writes "... the possibility of an
economic panic, the American stock exchange ceased trading on September 11, 2001, as news of
the terrorists' attacks spread across the globe" (pg. 112). Furthermore, many stock exchange
markets around the world watched the aftermaths of the September 11 in panic. Politicians and
bureaucrats also start to worry about the security and focus on the fight against terrorism instead
of their daily routine. Terrorism and security become the primary issue in the country and may
be replacing the welfare and health issues of the citizens. This list could be expanded. It is
essential to understand that the terrorist activities are usually used to reach long term goals and
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strategies.
Atmosphere of Chaos and Fear
Terrorists try to spread and form an atmosphere of chaos, fear, and panic in the targeted
population. With the help of publicity from their actions, terrorists try to reach people they are
targeting to make them feel and believe that they are living in constant danger. In this regard, in
most of the definitions and regulations, the words “fear”, “chaos” and “panic” are used to
describe this situation. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense uses fear in its description
of terrorism: “use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear” (Martin, 2003, p. 33).
Similarly, Hall and Clark while studying the definition of terrorism and the U.S. codes in his
book Companion to American Law, state that terrorism is "... the political goals of terrorists
often are ... create wide- spread panic and chaos. The increased concern ...” (2002, p. 102).
Accordingly, most terrorist organizations try to kill as many of their targets as possible to
escalate the panic and chaos. For example, the Mau-Mau movement in Kenya terrorized the
British who were the colonial invading power in Kenya during the 1950s. They spread such
violence that both the British people living in Kenya were not able to go out because they were
in such fear; additionally, even the British in London thousand of miles away from Kenya were
also afraid (Gilbert, 2011). This movement eventually allowed the native Kenyans to gain
autonomy. This example illustrates the far-reaching effects of terror. These psychological effects
on the society evoke a sense of horror, fear, vulnerability and indignity (Armborst, 2010) and
people begin to believe that anyone at anytime can be a victim of terrorism.
Conflict between the Society and the Governments
Terrorists want to create conflict between the society and the governments. The terrorists
desire that the fear and panic they are spreading will eventually galvanize the governments to go
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after them very harshly which is considered to lead a conflict in the society between the
government forces and the people. Eventually, this conflict is considered to be used for terrorists’
own grounds to overthrow the governments or to have the governments to counter their own
population for security reasons.
As a matter of fact, many philosophers argued that conflict is the only means for change
in society. For example, Marxist ideology argues that a political change cannot be achieved
without a conflict (Marx, 1887). Marx always argued that the workers and other people in the
society, in order to get what they want, have to confront the government and the owners of the
businesses to reach their demands.
Similarly, the Anti-Colonist philosopher Frantz Fanon argued that nobody would give up
power willingly; therefore, the power had to be taken violently (Fanon, 1967). In this regard,
terrorists always seek ways to force the governments they are terrorizing to go after them. The
terrorists are looking for a fight because they want the current government to change or fail. The
government typically responds with strict measures against their populations ranging from
conducting body searches on the streets to moving people to camps as prisoners1 or torturing the
suspects.
According to Marx this kind of conflict is believed to alienate the society from their
governments and have them to support the terrorist organizations in the long run to overthrow
the governments or to acquire their demands. Latin American terrorism, like in Uruguay,
constitutes a very good example for this pattern where most of the time the governments applied
state terrorism in the name of fighting terrorism like Uruguay. When the Tupomaro movement
began to spread its terror in Uruguay, the Uruguayan government began to terrorize its own
citizens while looking for the suspects. The tactics of the Uruguayan government involved
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torture, rape, beatings and murder, and those tactics were openly accepted by the officials. The
officers saw themselves as doing their official job while they were torturing or killing people
through their investigations to find the suspects. Being frightened from the terror of the state, the
people of Uruguay began to support the Tupamaros which led the Tupomaros to run for office as
they believed they could get the majority of the votes. However, they lost the elections and the
newly elected right-wing government used similar tactics to fight against the Tupomaros
involving many human right violations (Douglas, 2010).
Another good example of this pattern would be the Algerian independence movement
after the First World War, which ended the French occupation in Algeria in 1962. The Algerians
who wanted the French out of their country began to get organized under the leadership FLN
(Front de Libération Nationale, National Liberation Front). Their main goal was to get their
country back and to regain control of their countries’ resources from the occupying French
power (or they said, from the “whites”). They also wanted to get “those whites” from their
country (Art & Richardson, 2007). As they began to terrorize the French and those Algerians
who were collaborating with the French very closely, the French government took very strict
measures to stop this movement. They emptied and burned villages, tried to arrest all of the men
that were not working for them even if they had nothing to do with the FLN, imprisoned families
in the camps on very high mountains, and even tortured and killed the suspects. However, none
of those responses stopped the FLN members. In the conflict between the French and the
Algerians, the French lost 15,000 soldiers, and over 1.5 million Algerian civilians were killed
according to Algerians. However, French claimed there were 350,000 causalities (LOC, Algeriaa Country Study). At the end, the French had to leave Algeria, and the Algerians became
independent in 1962 (Martin, 2008).
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Secrecy
Terrorist organizations are clandestine by nature, and they usually try to apply the highest
secrecy standards inside the organization. They generally tend to be internally conservative and
closed groups because they want to preserve themselves from the government powers
(Crenshaw, 1995).
In order to maintain secrecy, the terrorists:
• Try to maintain a normal life style when looked from outside,
• Use fake IDs,
• Form terrorist cells,
• Cut their relations with their close circles like family members, relatives and close
friends (this may differ in ethnic terrorism),
• Have strict rules on secrecy,
• Try not to use any traceable communication techniques,
• Do not talk about their backgrounds to their companions to avoid being identified,
• If they do not stay in cells, they might prefer to stay with the sympathizers because of
security concerns because they believe that they will not survive if they are caught in
their cells.
Terrorists survive by blending into society. They always obey their internal security rules
to avoid revealing their locations, which is why they apply extreme caution while carrying out
their activities (Crenshaw, 1998). Their actions are generally well-planned. Planning and
approval of this plan are an intrinsic process that must be followed unless otherwise ordered by
leaders of the organizations. Terrorists want to make sure that everything during their activities
goes right without any problems; that's why they work on every detail before their attacks
including their route and tactics after their actions.
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Publicity of the terrorist activities has priority among the results of the terrorist incidents.
Terrorist tactics usually attract worldwide publicity very quickly because their violence is
designed to generate attention and publicity. As a matter of fact, publicity is a must for the
terrorists in order for them to survive and recruit new members. Terrorists seek ways to be on the
media to maintain publicity which helps them to gain recognition, present themselves as a group
that should not be ignored and that must be taken account of, recruit more people and
propagandize easier (Grunwald, 2001).
In fact, propaganda is impossible without the use of media, and it has been said that the
media is terrorist’s best friend as they are determined to give terrorist events maximum exposure
(Laqueur, 1999). They know the importance of the media, and they try to use media for their
own causes. This publicity, mostly due to the unpredicted and dramatic violent attacks of
terrorism, keeps terrorism in the forefront of the public eye and the government’s concern.
Also, the horrifying publicized face of terrorism forms an atmosphere of panic and fear
which could cause some officers and people to exaggerate the strength and importance of the
terrorist organization. There are many examples of the way publicity is manipulated a result of
terrorist events. Jenkins (2011) compares the insurgents who fought in Angola, Mozambique and
Portuguese Guinea to the Palestinians. The former groups used the standard tactics of guerilla
warfare for years and were hardly noticed by the world. However, when Palestinian terrorists
terrorized the Munich Olympics in 1972, they managed to gain publicity immediately, and they
sparked world-wide concern by generating global awareness (Ward, 2003).
In terms of causality, terrorism has a low occurrence, but when it occurs, its effects are
far-reaching (Sandler, 2011). Terrorist related casualties have a much lower probability when
compared with the other causes of deaths; however, due to the nature of terrorism, it is highly
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publicized. As the statistics are studied, it is obvious that the causalities that are the results of
terrorist activities are far less than the other types of reasons of causalities such as traffic
accidents.
For example, 6,694 people died because of terrorist-related incidents in 1998 in the
world, whereas, only in the United States, almost 17,000 people were murdered. Traffic
accidents took the lives of 41,504 people and over 7,000 people died from of infections. Similar
results come from Turkish statistics. For example, in 2001, almost 3,000 people died because of
traffic accidents while only 53 people (including the law enforcement those died in the conflicts)
died because of terrorism (TUIK, 2011).
When this rate is applied to the world’s population, the probability increases
significantly. As it is obviously seen from the statistics, there are many more causes of death
which rank considerably higher than terrorism. However, the causalities that are as a result of
terrorist activities attract more attention mostly due to publicity. Therefore, terrorism has low
probability but high consequences in terms of causality.
Unexpected Nature of Terrorism
Terrorism is unpredicted or unexpected cruelty. Terrorists get to choose their weapons,
place, and time of the attacks. Terrorists strike at unexpected times as most of the time the targets
are incapable of defending themselves. Choosing the location and time of their attacks leads
them to success in most of their attacks. Some scholars even used the word “unexpected” as one
of the major elements of their definition of terrorism as Gurr calls terrorism: “the use of
unexpected violence to intimidate or coerce people in the pursuit of political or social
objectives” (Gurr, 1970, p. 32).
Terrorists do not obey or recognize the rules of war and they are not concerned about any
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ethics. They have their own set of rules and announced enemies or targets. On the other hand,
there are clear rules for wars, and the innocent are supposed to be protected in the wars.
However, terrorists reverse the rules of wars or any ethical concerns by killing innocent people.
They put bombs in the places where there are many civilian causalities including children,
elderly and woman in order to kill as many as possible of them. Terrorists disregard the rules of
war and their mass killings are the motivation partial accomplishments of today’s terrorism,
which cannot be achieved by conventional war (Ross, 2006).
Terrorists also don’t wear uniforms and they blend in the society. It is impossible to
distinguish them form everyday people. Anybody could be a terrorist, and it is nearly impossible
to detect a private citizen who can hide explosions on his or her body easily.
Most of the terrorist movements fail to reach their long-term strategic goals and they
rarely achieve what they are after in the long run. In fact, government powers generally
overpower them and eventually the terrorists loose their power (Palmer & Palmer, 2008).
However, in the short run, terrorists can be successful due to the nature and characteristics of
their activities (Williamson, 2009). They can attract opponents of the current government,
political opponents, they can recruit many members, they can spread a massive violence, or they
can generate publicity and supporters.
For example, during their early establishments in Uruguay, the Tupomaros managed to be
seen or considered as an alternative power of the government with very few members (Schelling,
1960). Being very sure of their success and support, they decided to run for office. However,
their success came to an end when they began to kill the innocent people. Especially the killings
of the innocent turned over people from them and they lost the elections. Furthermore, if the
appropriate long term social precautions are not taken, the terrorists could win the long term by
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winning the hearts of the society (Smith, 2008).
Terrorism is usually the weapon of the weak that lacks the conventional powers of
military. The only exception to this is state terrorism (Douglas, 2010). The weaker party that
cannot fight conventionally tries to gain advantage by using terrorism. Terrorism has been a lowcost high-influence method. Terrorism may enable small groups, nations, sub-national groups
and even individuals to get around the requirements of national strength including political,
economic, or conventional military power (Amos II & Stolfi, 1982).
Terrorism may not achieve a political objective in the long run, but it certainly gives the
feeling of revenge and it also attracts the media and the world for the causes of the terrorists. As
long as the issues behind the terrorism continue to exist, frustration and peer pressure will lead to
other attempts of terrorism (Armborst, 2010). A terrorist in Palestine stated the following in an
interview: "Give me tanks and airplanes, and I shall stop sending suicide bombers into Israel"
(Faria, G, & M, 2005). The terrorists clearly try to justify themselves by arguing that they do not
have the conventional means of war and required infrastructure to carry out a war.
On the other hand, fighting against terrorism is difficult for the states because most of the
time they do not know where their enemy is or when and where the terrorists will strike.
Furthermore, the cell structure that is used by most terrorist organizations helps to maintain the
group’s security and near immunity from the law enforcement, which makes the fight against
terror more difficult.
A very good example for how terrorism becomes the weapon of the weak comes from
history. A group named Assassins or Hashishins terrorized the Anatolia region, today where
Turkey, Iran and Iraq intersects, for about 200 years. An Ishmaelite leader named Hassan bin
Sabbah, formed a terrorist organization that managed to survive between 1090 and 1275. Sabbah
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would recruit the young Ishmaelite ’s who were called fedains by using his fake heaven where he
served hashish to them by the hands of beautiful and young women which made those
youngsters addicted to this place. Sabbah preyed on the young men’s weakness and was able to
control them. For the sake of the hashish and the women, those fedains would do anything
Sabbah asked.
Fedains were very few in numbers; however, they managed to spread their terror so
extensively that people were afraid of to go out in the public since they were afraid of being
stabbed with the fedains’ poisoned daggers (Grunwald, 2001).
Workers' Party of Kurdistan PKK
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is a leftist Kurdish nationalist organization. It was
founded in 1974 by a group of Turkish students of ethnic Kurdish descent who were active in
communist circles within Turkey. PKK was operated informally until 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan.
Influenced heavily by Maoist doctrine, the PKK's goal was to incite a revolution that would free
the Kurdish people and establish an independent Kurdish state. When it was founded, the group
was violently opposed to the Turkish government, believing that a Kurdish state could only be
established if the oppressive and colonialist Turkish government was defeated (MIPT Database,
2006). The PKK is one of the bloodiest terrorist organizations in history. The PKK seeks to
establish an independent Marxist state in southeastern Turkey. It was formally formed in 1978 in
the capital city of Turkey, Ankara. It soon launched a violent campaign against people who
openly support the government and its policies and Kurdish tribes that had historically been
living peacefully with the Turkish government (Saladino, 2008).
By 1980, Turkey's internal security situation had gotten noticeably worse because of
randomly applied PKK terrorism. By the early 1980s, the group had ruthlessly murdered about
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250 people. Since 1984, random violence and the terrorist activities hold by the PKK have
claimed thousands of lives. Women, children and the old are not excluded from their attacks.
People have been murdered in front of their family members or kidnapped and executed
ruthlessly. Furthermore, the PKK has maintained a position as a sub-contractor of the
international terror and drug dealer networks. It preserved interactions with some Middle
Eastern, African, European, and Latin American terrorist groups as well as many drug
traffickers. Today, the PKK still tries to maintain its activities in Turkey; however, its terror has
dramatically declined after the capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, who was arrested in Kenya
and extradited to Turkey where he faced the death penalty on terrorism charges. However
Turkey abolished the death penalty in 2002 and his sentence was changed to life imprisonment.
The arrest of Ocalan seriously weakened the PKK. Following his arrest, Ocalan declared a
unilateral cease-fire and announced his desire to establish a "peace initiative" with Turkey on
Kurdish issues. The PKK affirmed Ocalan's wishes, purportedly disavowing its violent history.
Currently, the PKK struggles to maintain its activities especially in Northern Iraq, Syria, and
throughout Europe.
Turkish Hezbollah
Turkish Hezbollah was founded in southeastern Turkey during the early 1980's. Its goal
was the establishment of a Sunni Muslim theocracy in Turkey, which they attempted to achieve
by overthrowing Turkey's secular regime. Despite the common name, Turkish Hezbollah is
unrelated to the Iranian-sponsored Lebanese Hezbollah. It is suspected that Turkish Hezbollah
has also received Iranian funding and support, as Iran sought to spread its revolutionary Islamic
ideology into Turkey. Turkish Hezbollah focused the bulk of its attacks on the PKK, which it
accused of anti-Muslim activities. The group also focused on spreading its Islamic theology
32

through Turkey through bookstores and publishing houses. Because the Turkish government's
main counterterrorism efforts at this time were directed against the PKK, some accuse the
government of supporting and funding Turkish Hezbollah as a proxy, a charge they deny.
Regardless of official government complicity, their focus on combating PKK allowed Turkish
Hezbollah to act without fear of government reprisal. Charges of connections to the Turkish
government are furthered by the fact that from its founding until 2000, Turkish Hezbollah was
not involved in any violent confrontation with Turkish police or security forces (Arinç, 2010).
The group’s situation greatly changed in the mid 1990’s, as PKK’s threat to Turkey
waned, culminating in a 1999 truce. It became a target for the Turkish government when the
group began to target secular academics and journalists, feminists and religious Muslims who did
not support its goal of establishing an Islamic state in Turkey. Full-scale operations against the
group by the Turkish government began in 2000, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of militants
throughout southeastern Turkey. Turkish police, investigating the fraudulent use of a kidnapped
businessperson’s credit card, were led to small house in the city of Beykoz, where a shootout
ensued and the group’s leader, HuseyinVelioglu, was killed. Many of its remaining members
have escaped to Iran and Iraq (Arinç, 2010).
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front DHKP/C
DHKP/C is a Turkish leftist terrorist organization originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci
Sol or Dev- Sol, which is a splinter faction of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front
(THKP/C). After factional infighting, it was renamed in 1994 as the Revolutionary People's
Liberation Party/Front DHKP/C. The group espouses a strong Marxist ideology is extremely
anti-US, anti-NATO, and is an anti-western organization in purpose (Uslu, 2007).
DHKP/C’s ideology is similar to that of other radical Turkish leftists. The group believes
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that the Turkish government is a fascist regime, controlled by the domineering, imperialist forces
of the West, especially the United States and NATO. The group seeks to destroy these Western
influences through violence and Marxist revolution. In its early years, when it was still known as
Dev Sol, the group focused largely on political assassinations.
A crackdown by Turkish authorities in the early 1980s forced the group to restrict its
activities, though in the late 1980s Dev Sol was able to increase its attacks against Turkish
military targets. Despite internal troubles, the DHKP/C has managed to retain the ideology and
goals of the original Dev Sol movement. The group has continued to conduct violent attacks
against Turkish government targets as well as against Western interests in Turkey. The group has
also sought to bring attention to its imprisoned members by staging hunger protests.
More recently, the group has been intensely outspoken against US military operations in
Afghanistan and in Iraq. DHKP/C believes that these operations are proof of the imperialist
intentions of the United States. According to DHKP/C, creation of a classless society and the
establishment of the revolutionary power of the people are essential. DHKP/C defines the term
the revolutionary power of the people as the power of all the people's forces that are against
oligarchy and imperialism. DHKP/C still remains active in Turkey and in most European
countries including Belgium Italy, Holland, Germany, Greece and France. Its main activities
include assassinations, arson, and bombings.
The Group’s most noticeable activities were the assassination of a former Prime Minister
and a former Justice Minister in Turkey and an attempt to assassinate the U.S. President George
Bush during his visit to Istanbul in 1992. The movement is mainly active in the universities
among the socialist idealist students. DHKP/C is one of the two European leftist terrorist
organizations that were included in the U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist List and it is also
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considered as a terrorist organization by European countries.
DHKP-C’s Political Army Fighting strategy specifies using rural and urban guerillas in
order to weaken the authority and prepare the environment for a possible revolution. In 1992,
Bedri Yagan was sent to the Bekaa Valley to start the guerilla training of the organization. The
party trained many of its members in this training camp to send to Turkey. However after the
1992 split, the activities in the Bekaa Valley stopped and then were closed down by
administration. Nevertheless, the organization today has some small armed-cells in big cities to
plan and carry out some sensational actions.
The strategies of DHKP/C are different from the other terrorist organizations because
they tried to start a revolution in both the cities and countryside at the same time. There are five
stages in this revolution:


Vanguard war



Increasing vanguard struggle and starting a guerilla war



Growing and spreading guerilla war out of the country



Connecting to local units

This situation would lead Turkey to the fifth stage, a victory of communist revolution. In
this strategy, although they believe that public support is very important to be successful, the
army is the key element of revolution.
They believe that the only way to strike down the imperialism and set up communism is
an armed struggle. The strategy of Devrimci Sol is the strategy of the People's War, which
means they achieve power directly from the working people. According to Mahir Cayan, the
foundered of THKP/C, this strategy can be defined as: "The strategy which takes armed
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propaganda as a basis and subordinates all other political, economic, and democratic forms of
struggle to this basic form of struggle, is called the politicized-military war strategy" (Collected
Works, 1995). Therefore, DHKP/C depends on armed struggle; in other words, the army unit is
the based organization of this terrorist organization.
The main goal of DHKP-C is to overthrow the existing regime in Turkey and in its place,
to set up a new regime based on Marxism and Leninism. DHKP-C believes that the party is the
pioneer organization that will lead the public on the way of Marxist-Leninist revolution.DHKP/C
plans to start a people’s revolutionary war because of the belief that the only way to set up a
communist government is through this war of the people to start to destroy the current
government. They believe that if the current government were destroyed, the communist system
may be founded easily.
Radical Terrorism
Until the French revolution, religions had been believed to be the major factor which
determines the people’s behaviors towards the authorities. Most of the religions, especially the
celestial ones; Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, asked their members to conform to the teachings
of their religious leaders. In fact, most of the authorities, in the west and east, were influenced by
their religions in administrative issues. The French Revolution; however, was a turning point in
this regard, transforming the classical religious state notion to the modern secular state in which
the citizens have equal rights against the government. Marx, on the other hand, took the
secularist approach one step further denying all kinds of religions and their informal regulations
on the behaviors of the people against the authorities. To him, religion was a drug which
inebriated people and helped them follow conformity encouraged by religion. With the spread of
Marxism in the world, the religious movements, especially the Islamic movements, found
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themselves in the defense of the religions as the Marxism was denying their religion. This caused
a polarization between the people often living in the same country. Occasionally, this
polarization was used to manipulate the religions through violence. Religions were sometimes
used to spark independence movements and often used by the terrorist leaders to recruit and to
spread their terrorism. This section of the literature review focuses on the issues related with the
religion inspired terrorist movements. This starts with the definition of imperialism as it is
frequently used in this literature and then the religions are studied for their approach to terrorism.
Karl Marx, 1844
Marxism emerged as a theory in response to the Industrial Revolution. There are three
major aspects of the Marxist ideology including: philosophy, economics, and history. First,
Marxism is an economic system in response to capitalism. Second, Marxism is a philosophy.
Marxist philosophy is based on the ideas on human character and about how human beings
function in the world. Marx is interested in the relationship between materialist and idealist
philosophy (Smith, 2008). As a philosopher, Marx characterized a stem of philosophy called
“dialectical materialism” to describe the materialist approach and human relations throughout
history. In history, Marx studies the history of human kind and tries to prove how changed
occurred as a result of struggles. In his theories, Marx defines religion as “the sigh of the
oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions”
(Komorzynski, 1897). Moreover, Marx calls for the demolition of any religion for the happiness
of the society. He says that “the abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the
demand for their real happiness” (Komorzynski, 1897). To call on them to give up their illusions
about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The
criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion
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is the halo” (Marx, 1887).
Therefore, Marxism opposed any religion including Islam and other celestial religions,
Judaism and Christianity. In an effort to follow Marx’s ideas, in the Soviet Russia and its
followers around the world especially in the Easter Europe, the religions were harshly targeted,
they were forbidden, the temples were closed and the holy books were burned. The newly
emerged Communist Regimes completely prohibited religions and most of the time killed almost
all of the religious leaders to ensure the decease of religions. The Communists extended a true
war campaign against any religions in the eyes of the whole world as they were establishing their
states. Many people suffered from these despot campaigns especially in the early establishments
of the Communist States.
Most of the people who suffered from the Communist brutality against religion were the
Muslims. There were many Muslims in the newly emerged Communist States and they quickly
became the enemy of those states. Seeing this cruelty against their same religion brothers and
sisters, the Muslim world interpreted Marxism as one of the greatest enemy causing a deep
polarization between the Marxists and Muslims. Several Muslims felt hatred against the Marxists
as they saw or read what happened to people under those regimes. Consequently, the Communist
War against religion caused a deep contradiction and polarization between the Muslims and
Leftists.
This contradiction led to radicalism among some communities as they believed they had
to do something but they were not able to. In this regard, sometimes regional violent activities
were a response to communism. In addition to regional activities, some people went overseas or
abroad in an effort to help the people who were suffering under the communists. Consequently,
this polarization and hatred caused radicalization among some Muslims. The recent Soviet
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invasion of Afghanistan illustrates this point. Many people went to Afghanistan to help the
Afghan Mujahideen in their fight against Soviet Russia. Unfortunately, sometimes good
intentions and feelings were radicalized due to the harsh conditions of war by the extremists who
were also fighting. When added with inadequate education and disconnection from the rest of the
world, the former warriors against the Soviets were so ready to extend their war against new
enemies.
A regional example comes from the Turkish Hezbollah in this sense. When the leftist and
ethnic terrorist organization PKK emerged in the southern part of Turkey, the people living in the
region who were targeted by the PKK formed a religious based terrorist organization with the
sole aim of fighting against the leftist PKK. They considered themselves an enemy of
Communism and tried to struggle with the PKK just because it was a leftist terrorist organization
harming their society both ideologically and physically. However, this organization again could
not draw lines for its activities and after a period of time the enemy list began to rise and they
started to target other people. The Turkish Hezbollah, being only the exclusive enemy of the
PKK, soon began to carry out attacks against the government forces and civilians.
Dictatorships in Muslim Countries
Almost, all of the countries in the Middle East and some of the other Muslim countries
are governed by brutal dictators most of whom were granted authority through their fillies by
their colonial powers after the First World War. Moreover, those dictators have enjoyed widely
support from the modern world including the west and the United States. In fact, some of them
are still considered the puppets of their old colonial regimes. In addition to this support, these
dictators failed to represent the majority of the people they are governing as most of the times
those dictators happen to be from a small minority group just like Saddam Hussein in Iraq or
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Hafiz and Bessir Assad in Syria. Often those dictators opposed and suppressed their own people
through their secret services, police and military. Moreover, the people under those regimes
usually did not have some of the basic rights that the western world provides to its citizens. Even
today, the image of Middle East in the world is disappointing. When the term “Middle East” is
stated, people out of the “Middle East” thinks about either a ruler in luxury and dissipation, who
is at the same time a despot, blood-thirsty president constantly oppressing his people and at the
same time who is corrupted with the misuse of the oil revenues and foreign aid that was
generously given to him or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Aras & Tokta, 2007).
Most people in the Middle East usually feel frustrated because of two reasons. First is the
support of the western world to their dictators. Even though the western world including the U.S.
always promoted democracy, it is a different story when it came to the Middle East. Most of the
dictators enjoyed wide range support of the west especially military wise and politically. Seeing
the support of the West and the United States, the people in the Middle East and some other
Muslim countries became frustrated of the west. The people in the Middle East also become
upset as they see the Western and the U.S. based military equipment used against them.
The second disturbance comes from the unavailability of basic rights that are provided
the states. Especially with the availability of the internet and cable or dish television networks
and through the visits to the other countries, the people in the Middle East realize the broad
rights and luxury the west and the U.S. people are enjoying. Even though most of the Middle
East countries have ample resources through oil revenues, people believe that their dictators use
the oil revenue for their own sake and security. Therefore, the people in the Middle East are
frustrated from their rulers who do not represent them, from the open political and military
backing and support of the U.S. and the West and from being unable to benefit of the oil

40

revenues. As a result of this frustration and common grievances in those societies, some terrorist
and radical organizations have the opportunity and atmosphere of easily manipulating the people,
especially the emotional youth, through their causes most of the time by using the religion
(Diamond, Plattner, & Brumberg, 2003; Kaylan, 2005).
Understanding Terrorism before Developing Coping Strategies
One of the most important ways of understanding terrorism is understanding why people
become terrorists. This question is as vast as the question of why people commit crime. Thus as
opposed to delving into all possible explanations of becoming a terrorist, a more practical
approach would be more pragmatic. Understanding the recruitment process of the terrorist
organizations is a practical way to approach this issue. Through an understanding of the
recruitment process and the subsequent employment and abuse of the terrorist organization
members, coping strategies can be developed.
The Modus Operandi of Recruitment: The Dynamic Terrorist Recruitment Model
Although the literature on terrorist recruitment provided some insights about the methods
of recruitment (Bloom; Faria, et al., 2005; Gates, 2006; Klein, 2005; Stahl, 2006; Wanous,
1980), a general recruitment pattern is not supported by empirical evidence. Despite the large
body of terrorism research on the psychological dimensions of terrorism and terrorists with
regard to the root causes of joining terrorist groups and committing violence, only a limited
number of researchers focused on the involvement process. In this regard, Klein (2005) suggest
that it may be appropriate to investigate the involvement process rather than the psychological
qualities of terrorists. Although the theory of which they spoke is not supported by research, they
assert that important life events involving work, family, religion, and the like can pave the way
to terrorism. Similarly, studies on risk assessment suggest that certain factors increase the
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likelihood of involvement with terrorism (Jenkins, 2011; Miller & Mills, 2010; Wanous, 1980).
Among these factors are social and economic conditions such as poverty, losses due to life
events, and the like—factors that fall in line with previous studies. This study indicated that poor
socioeconomic conditions are propagated by the terrorist organizations.
Considering that both the terrorist organizations studied here are selective of certain
individual characteristics, the potential recruit is passive at the first stage of recruitment. This
finding contradicts Ross’s (2006) study regarding Al-Qaeda, mainly because Al-Qaeda has a
larger recruitment pool as well as popular support. Additionally, Al-Qaeda appears to be an
ideological movement rather than a small scale terrorist group. Therefore, there should be a
demand for new recruits from the terrorist organization, since the potential recruit is passive. The
demand for new recruits may, however, vary from time to time due to police operations, the
political context of the country, and other external factors. For example, an organization may be
reluctant to recruit new members during intense police crackdowns on terrorism. As mentioned
by the TNP officers, for instance, some radical groups become popular at certain times
depending on the political context of the countries.
Under suitable conditions for recruitment, the terrorist organization contacts ideologically
prone individuals through friends, relatives, or associations of the organization. The majority of
DHKP/C and Hezbollah terrorists are recruited by their friends or relatives. Previous research is
supportive of this point. Accordingly, Combs (2010) mentions that for the individuals who
become active terrorists the initial connection is often made by a friend or a group. Similarly,
(2006) mentions that people are recruited through kinship and friendship associations. People are
influenced to join a terrorist organization by seeking solidarity with family, friends, or
acquaintances (Martin, 2011).
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Thus, in this reciprocal association between the terrorist organization’s agent and the
potential recruit, the organization offers a sense of belonging, solidarity, self-esteem, and the like
to the recruit through propaganda. Propaganda is a psychological process undertaken to influence
the beliefs of a potential recruit. In this regard, ideology is used to justify the actions of the
recruiter or the organization. During this stage, the individual is informed about the organization
over time. If the individual demonstrates his or her willingness to be in the organization, as this
study indicated, the next stage of recruitment starts.
The third stage of recruitment involves brainwashing and fostering ideological
commitment. An individual is tested and expected to prove his or her dedication to the ideology
and goals of the organization. This is one of the reasons why both DHKP/C and Hezbollah
terrorists have higher criminal records; the terrorist group facilitates criminal activity. Terrorist
organizations, in this stage, try to isolate individuals from their family and social groups in order
to more easily impose their particular ideology. In this regard, it is essential to know the
individual’s social and institutional ties in order to discern whether the involvement is an adverse
outcome of weak ties, but this information is unavailable in the current study data sets.
However, research on group dynamics in gangs suggests that potential terrorist recruits,
like potential gang recruits, suffer from weak social and institutional ties, which in turn makes
the individual more vulnerable for recruitment (Ness, 2007). Breaking the social and
psychological ties of the potential recruits helps foster a consciousness of and investment in the
collective movement and breed an inclination toward the terrorist organization. For example, a
DHKP/C terrorist candidate is expected to participate in the Labor Day protests on May 1, follow
the organization’s publications, and attend the organization’s meetings and activities. Terrorist
groups, however, vary significantly from gangs due to the ideology factor in recruitment.
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Ideology is an essential part of terrorist recruitment; the potential recruit comes to believe that
the terrorist organization will remedy the existing problems both of the individual and the
society. Ideology is like a holy book for the potential recruit, a resource that contains answers for
every possible question.
Eventually, if the performance of the potential recruit is observed to be sufficient by the
terrorist recruiter, he or she will be asked to report his or her detailed personal information. The
contact person will then report this information to the terrorist organization. The police-seized
terrorist resumes and interviewees views confirm this process.
In the final stage, depending on the organization’s recruitment decision, a potential
recruit is accepted to or rejected from the terrorist organization. As the current research suggests,
it is highly unlikely that an applicant will be rejected by the organization after the submission of
personal information, because the candidate has already been observed to be qualified by the
recruiter. At every stage of the dynamic recruitment model, variations in the individual’s and
terrorist organization’s behaviors are possible (See Figure 1).
In this recruitment approach, the terrorist organization plays the central role, because
there should be a demand from the terrorist organization for recruitment regardless of how the
potential recruit is motivated or what sorts of characteristics he or she holds. Recruitment to the
terrorist organization is primarily a top-down process rather than a bottom-up process. This
model may prove to vary, however, if the modus operandi of recruitment of other terrorist
organizations is investigated.
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Demand for new recruits:
Context in the target population and in the terrorist
organization
Initial contact with potential recruit:
Friends, relatives, organizational associations

Selection Process:

Propaganda

Testing the recruit (Ideological
commitment/brainwashing/facilitation of
criminal activity)

Assessment of candidates by the terrorist organization

Drop out

Recruit

Figure 1. The Dynamic Terrorist Recruitment Model1
Conclusion
Terrorism and non-traditional conflict have become a part of the daily life of Turkey and
the Turkish National Police. The main problem with terrorism in Turkey is that there are no
definite boundaries to what they might and might not do and who they are and who they are not.

1

Adopted from Ekici (2006).
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This study attempts to add to the understanding of the criminal mind of a terrorist and solve the
puzzle of the effect of true belief on terrorist act.
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Chapter 3

Research Design and Methodology

Introduction
Nachmias & Nacmias (1996) explain that a researcher should clarify fundamental
problems before starting a research project. These are as follows: who is being studied, what is
observed, how the data is collected, and how the data will be used. This chapter provides a
discussion concerning the research approach, research design, unit of analysis, data collection,
hypothesis, and data analysis procedures.
The research approach used in this study was secondary data analysis. Secondary data is
any analysis of data collected by another researcher or organization for some other
purposes(Hakim, 1987). The reason for the increased utilization of secondary data is its
methodological advantages. In most general implementation, secondary data research the dataset
is used to replicate the original research’s results or to address an entirely different question
(Hakim, 1987).
The main hypothesis of this study indicates that higher the sincerity of terrorists the
higher the number of terrorist incidents and higher the violence levels. This study examines
Turkey’s terrorism problem in depth by using content analysis method in light of a mixture of the
mainstream crime theories and identifies some factors that are related to the formation of
terrorism. It is believed that this may assist policy makers develop new policies that can
eliminate fertile ground where terrorism easily finds support.
To conceptualize the hypotheses the Content Analysis with the help of Integrated Crime
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Theories approach will be used which can be described as a research method in which the theory
is developed from the data, rather than the other way around. This approach makes this study an
inductive approach. The study will be driven from the specific to the more general. Glaser and
Strauss (1968) state that this method of study is essentially based on three elements: concepts,
categories and propositions, or what was originally called “hypotheses”. However, concepts are
the key elements of analysis since the theory is developed from the conceptualization of data,
rather than the actual data.
The data for the variables of demographic indicators were gathered from the databases of
Turkish National Police Testimonial Reports of Terrorist Members. Statistical analysis and
content analysis were utilized as a statistical method for this study in order to examine the
relationship of sincerity level, and violence level of terrorist incidents.
Mixed Crime Theories
There are numerous theories in criminology striving to explain the concept of
delinquency in quite different ways. Since the 1960s the field has been dominated by a
multitude of seemingly unrelated and competitive theories like anomie, social disorganization,
differential association, social control, deterrence, labeling, ethnomethodology and conflict
(Messner, Krohn, & Liska, 1989). According to some criminologists this large number of
theories has made the field seem fragmented (Messner, et al., 1989); most criminologists would
agree that the large quantity of theories does not enrich the field but it becomes an obstacle for
scientific progress (T. J. Bernard, 1990). Recently, there is a trend in the field of criminology to
reduce the number of numerous theories that creates confusion and reach a constructive solution.
Some believe that the way to reduce this number is through falsification. The idea is that
the contradictory predictions of different theories can be subjected to competitive testing in
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which research determines which predictions are supported by data and which are not. Theories
that are falsified as a result of this process can be discarded and in this way the number of
theories can be reduced (T. J. Bernard & Snipes, 1996). Others believe for a variety of practical
reasons that the falsification process will fail since, as Bernard and Ritti (T. J. Bernard & Ritti,
1990) indicated, simply, some theories cannot be falsified as there is no precise and exact
statement of what the theory asserts. Therefore integration is the alternative way to falsification
to be taken in order to reduce the number of criminological theories (Vold, Bernard, & Snipes,
2002).
The current research findings in the form of criminological bits and pieces are
unconnected to an overall theoretical structure or framework and this has lead some practitioners
of the field to reach the conclusion that it is time to bring order to the field by drawing related
lines of theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence together (Gibbons, 1994). The idea of
theoretical integration is not only consistently reasonable but it also might assist the field of
criminology to make sense of existing evidence and might indicate the linkages between
theoretical arguments that have not been apparent (Gibbons, 1994). However, no matter how
logical the idea might be, integrating a couple of existing theories and creating a compound
theory that would explain all the variances of the assumptions they included is not as easy as it
sounds.
The definition of crime is quick to change and its ambiguity makes it impossible to be
thoroughly explained by a single theoretical framework. Acts labeled as crime are so diverse
that general theories can only explain similar phenomena. The causes of crime are too complex
to fit in a single theoretical perspective and that’s why efforts in the past toward a general theory
of crime and the oppositional tradition failed (Elliott, Huizinga, & Ageton, 1985; Tittle, 1989).
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There came a time where there was a clearly pressing need for theoretical development in order
to explain a wide range of crime and therefore efforts were concentrated at theoretical integration
(Messner, et al., 1989).
Through integration and by using joint explanatory power of different crime theories this
study seeks to answer the terrorism related research question. The literature suggests that crimes
are mostly committed by people between the ages 13 and 24 and then start to decrease as the age
increases (Farrington, 1986). Therefore, a measure of age is included in the research design.
According to Merton (2003) and Messner and Rosenfeld (2003) when social institutions such as
the family are weak in developing the social norms, anomie or normlessness ensues. Thus a
measure of supervision is also included in the design.
Besides, because of the lack of collective efficacy, communities become disorganized
(Robert J. Sampson, et al., 2003; Shaw & McKay, 2003) and when informal social control
mechanisms (social bonds and self control) do not operate efficiently (Gottfredson & Hirschi,
2003; Hirschi, 2003; Reckless, 2003) criminal behavior occurs. Thus measures of broken
families (single female household, percent married population) and social disorganization
(percent renters, percent living in urban areas) are added in the models. There are also theories
that argue that males are more likely than females to engage in crime (Messerschmitt, 2003) and
racial minorities are more likely to engage in crime (Anderson, 2003; Robert J. Sampson &
Wilson, 2003).
Content Analysis
While theory integration is concerned with the discovery of hypotheses from texts,
content analysis is concerned with testing hypotheses, usually, but not always, quantitatively.
This requires (a) creating a set of codes, (b) applying those codes systematically to a set of texts,
50

(c) testing reliability of coders when more than one applies the codes to a set of texts, (d)
creating a unit of analysis by variable matrix from the texts and codes and (e) analyzing that
matrix statistically(H. R. Bernard, 2000).
With the data collected from Turkish National Police this research aims to determine the
presence of certain words or concepts that implies sincerity, fidelity, and alienation. Later, this
study quantifies and analyzes the presence, meanings and relationships of such words and
concepts, then makes inferences about the messages within the texts. Texts can be defined as
testimonial reports of 3 different terrorist groups during their custody within TNP. To conduct a
content analysis on any such text, the text is coded, or broken down, into manageable categories
on a variety of levels--word, word sense, phrase, sentence, or theme--and then examined using
one of content analysis' basic methods: the conceptual analysis.
According to Krippendorff (2004), six questions must be addressed in every content
analysis, and this study aims to find address these questions as well as the relationship with the
sincerity and terrorist activity:
Which data are analyzed?
How are they defined?
What is the population from which they are drawn?
What is the context relative to which the data are analyzed?
What are the boundaries of the analysis?
What is the target of the inferences?
Data Collection
500 different terrorists’ testimonial reports are collected from Turkish National Police
database between 1999 and 2006 randomly. These cases represent most of the terrorist groups
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such as PKK, Hezbollah, Ibda-C, Dev-Sol and Al-kaide.
The corpus of texts will be these 500 testimonial reports.
Unit of Analysis will be individual cases from terrorist groups.
Intercoder reliability will be tested with another Turkish coder, the idea is to see whether
the constructs being investigated are shared whether multiple coders reckon that the same
constructs apply to the same chunks of texts.
Hypotheses
H1: There is a positive relationship between sincerity and level of violence.
Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this hypothesis
based on the variables “Sincerity Level’ and “Violence Level”.
H2: The more educated terrorist has the more violent terrorist activities.
Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this hypothesis
based on the variables “Education’ and “Total Score”.
H3: Males are the more likely to have more violent activities than the females.
Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this
hypothesis based on the variables “Gender’ and “Total Score”.
H4: Singles are the more likely to have more violent activities than the married terrorists.
Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this
hypothesis based on the variables “Marital Status’ and “Total Score”.
H5: Separatist group members are more likely to have more violent activities than the Leftists
and Religiously Motivated terrorists.
Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this
hypothesis based on the variables “Type of Terrorist Group’ and “Total Score”.
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Methodology
The research approach used in this study is based on official data. The official statements
of terrorists are used as secondary data. Secondary data has some methodological and practical
advantages like availability, low cost and large sampling.
Based on official data, a cross-sectional research design is employed in this study. The
relationship between several relevant variables is examined using multivariate statistical analysis
techniques.
The unit of analysis in this research design is the terrorist group member individuals.
There are a total of 500 individuals examined in the data set. These individuals are convicted
terrorists or terror suspects that are either candidate or veteran terrorists.
Variables
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is a measure of the activities done by the terrorists.
This is a limited continuous variable ranging from the less violent activity to the most violent
activity. The terrorists’ criminal actions have been classified into categories. These categories
were based on their own statements, which they gave to the Counter Terrorism Department
during the interrogation after they were captured. Based on the terrorists’ own statements, which
were taken by the Counter Terrorism Department when they were captured, their criminal
actions were classified into categories and thus the first part of the variable is formed.
A score is assigned to each terrorist depending on his or her activity in the organization.
This will allow to make comparisons among terrorists. Each terrorist also gets scores from their
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activities in order to compare them to each other. For every year within the groups they will be
scored by 10 points. If the terrorist has been in the organization for 5 years he or she will get 50
points, plus his or her terrorist activities will be count as each killing is 10 points, or each
kidnapping is 6 points. This gives the researcher an opportunity to compare the new member to
an older one.

Figure 2 Measure of Terrorist Activity

Level of
Violence
Score

Intensity
of
Violence
Score

Terrorist
Activity
Score

As shown in Figure 1, the more violent and the more intense the activities, the higher the
score of the terrorist.
Content Analysis
This study uses content produced from terrorist statements and examine the content
by analyzing relevant incidents and acts in order to identify the common themes of violence and
various aggravated levels of criminal acts perpetrated with a view to achieve terrorist groups
political or other goals. All statements within the data set were included in the content analysis.
The unit of analysis is terrorist statements for the content analysis procedure.
All statements were coded according to four types of information: basic crime category,
terrorist organization, individual factors, and modus operandi. 10 coders from the Turkish
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National Police seeking masters of PhD degree attending several colleges and universities in the
U.S. were selected for the coding process. Preferably, coders who previously worked at the antiterror department in Turkey were selected.
In order to determine the level of violence the modus operandi of the criminal acts subject
to legal action were examined for concrete actions such as use of firearms, possession of
firearms, drug dealing for monetary gain for the organization, murder, theft, bombing etc. While
some statements comprised a single criminal act, others were linked with other crimes and other
incidents. Thus, each case were given a code based on the date and place of crime lest some
incidents are coded twice. A code is a type of score. By assigning the same code to different acts
of the terrorists, an analyst is ascribing the same and equal value to those acts.
Independent Variables
Sincerity Level
One of the concerns of the previous studies on the psychological dimensions of the
terrorists was whether terrorists are already abnormal individuals. Further research indicated that
not all terrorists are criminals (Silke, 2003). Thus the question of why normal, non-violent
individuals resort to violence when they become a member of the terrorist organization. If they
start normal and later become violent then the personality traits of terrorists would be highly
irrelevant. Studies show that terrorist groups do not specifically seek out criminals like gangs do
(Jenkins, 2011; Klein, 2005; Lennings, Amon, Brummert, & Lennings, 2010; Miller & Mills,
2010; Stahl, 2006), and obviously the group’s normative structure facilitates criminal activity.
In that sense, organizational attachment and blind adherence are left as an explanation.
Sincerity in this study is used as a measure of attachment and adherence. Sincerity variable is
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derived from the statements with content analysis technique. If the terrorist is mentioning the
Turkish Government as different country and feels like he or she does not belong to it, s/he is
considered as sincere, otherwise he or she will be considered as insincere. If the person does not
fall into any category, he or she will be treated as ambiguous.
Recruitment and Group Related Variables
The question of how and through whom individuals contact terrorist organizations and
become a member has been one of the concerns of the existing terrorism literature. Terrorist
groups’ social networks, as well as individuals’ close circles are believed to play an important
role in recruitment process. In this regard, as a similar group in terms of their group dynamics,
associations in youth gang groups play a central role in becoming involved with the criminal
group. For instance, having delinquent peers and having an existing family member in the gang
were some of the statistically most reliable indicators of gang involvement. Studies indicate that
terrorists extensively use social networks for recruitment(Crenshaw, 1998; Ekici, 2006; Laqueur,
1999; Silke, 2003). Friendship and family networks as well as legal organizational associations
are the major tools used by terrorist organizations to reach out to potential recruits (Ekici, 2006).
Length of membership in the Group
This variable is a self-reported continuous variable.
Reason for Joining the Group
This is a nominal variable broken into dichotomus variables. In the interview the
terrorists are asked to choose between 5 choices for reasons for joining the group (just curiosity,
personal motivations, socialization, inadequate family supervision, low income). As a reference
group personal motivations is left out.
Status
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This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is convicted (value is zero).
The other group is candidate (value is 1).
Separatist
This is dichotomous variable where the reference group is Leftist/Radical (value is zero).
The main group is separatist (value is 1).
Socio-demographics
Education Level
Education level is a categorical variable where the lowest category signifies lowest level
of education. This variable ranges from 1 to 5.
Age
This variable is a continuous variable and calculated as of the date of the interview.
Gender
This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is females (value is zero).
Marital Status
This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is non-married (value is zero).
Occupational Status
This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is non-working (value is zero).
Economic Status
This is a categorical variable. where the lowest category signifies lowest level of
education. This variable ranges from 1 to 5.
Ethnicity
This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is Turk (value is zero).
Religious Affiliation
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This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is Sunni (value is zero).
Conclusion
This study will examine the correlates of the level of violence in terrorist actions based
on individual level data collected officially. The following sections reports the results of the
statistical analyses based on the above outlined methodology.
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Chapter 4

Statistical Analysis

Introduction
This chapter presents the research findings of the current study. The general strategy in
presenting the results is to report descriptive statistics, and interview results for each piece of
information obtained. Interview results are reported when relevant information is available.
Multivariate statistics are presented at the end of the section for the impact of sincerity on
terrorist activity across the various terrorist groups that operate in Turkey.
Basic descriptive statistics for the variables used in this section are given in Table 2.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Dependent Variable
Terrorist Activity

500

160.86

219.55

1.00

1150

500

0.009

0.383

-1

1

Age

500

22.994

18.391

17
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Gender (male)

500

0.817

0.387

0

1

Marital Status

500

0.708

0.456

0

1

Level of Education

500

0.385

0.751

1

5

Occupational Status

500

0.509

0.738

0

1

Explanatory Variable
Sincerity
Control Variables
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Ethnicity (Kurdish)

500

0.217

0.567

0

1

Religious Affiliation (Alevi)

500

0.301

0.497

0

1

Economic Status

500

0.459

0.674

1

5

Length of Membership

500

19.744

21.425

1

45

Curiosity

500

0.196

0.674

0

1

Socialization

500

0.246

0.525

0

1

Inadequate Supervision

500

0.178

0.298

0

1

Low Income

500

0.312

0.502

0

1

Status (Convicted)

500

0.478

0.389

0

1

Separatist

500

0.413

0.367

0

1

Characteristics of the Terrorist Group
The interviews showed that the most of the candidate and convicted terrorists are males
with a percentage of 81%. Most of the terrorist organizations in Turkey have many legally
established youth clubs and culture houses that provide social environments and activities for
high school and college level students, where students from the opposite sex meet and establish
new relationships. The study samples also showed that the majority of the terrorists are
ethnically Turks. Convicted terrorists were found to be predominantly Turkish (89%), whereas
the Turks made up only 55% of the candidate terrorists.
While ethnicity is not a determinant factor in the selection process for some terrorist
organizations, PKK solely recruits Kurds. While by itself not an ethnical affiliation, being an
Alevi in terms of religious belief is also considered as a separate ethnical group as this faith is
followed only by a certain group. Due to the difference in their religious beliefs and due to the
notion that they are being discriminated against, Alevi community members are ideal recruits for
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terrorist organizations.
Some terrorist organizations abuse the Alevi community as a tool for their goals due to
the left-oriented worldview of this community. In some cases, even those who are not Alevi are
shown as Alevis by the terrorist organizations when they are killed in terrorist attacks or
police/military operations. Organizations agitate Alevi community during the terrorist funerals.
They publicize that the Alevi community in Turkey is suppressed and discriminated against.
Thus, the Alevi community becomes more prone for new recruits.
One of the common characteristics of the candidate and convicted terrorists is their
marital status. Eighty-eight percent of the candidate terrorists and 67% of the convicted terrorists
were never married. In most terrorist organizations, marriage is only allowed for camouflaging
purposes, which is generally referred to as “revolutionary marriage” inside the organizations.
Statistics show that the majority of terrorists have chosen to move from their original
birthplace to another city. Sixty percent of the candidate terrorists and 79% of the convicted
terrorists moved from their original birth place to the big cities to improve their quality of life,
especially for job and education opportunities.
When we look at the statistics, we observe some differences between convicted and
candidate terrorists in terms of several attributes. Candidate terrorists are more educated with
37% university or higher education than convicted terrorists are with 11%. In terms of job status,
most of the convicted terrorists have a full-time or part-time job compared to candidate terrorists
(56% and 14% respectively).
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Table 2 Characteristics of the Candidate and Convicted Terrorists

Characteristics

Candidate Terrorists

Convicted Terrorists

Male (%)
Turk (%)
Alevi (%)
Never married (%)

67
51
92
88

83
88
81
67

Mobility (%)

60

79

13
55
31

41
51
9

13
30
51
5

51
17
17
15

69
31

82
18

Education (%)
Primary and less
Secondary and high
University and upper
Job status (%)
Full-time or part-time
Temporarily not working
Unemployed
Other
Type of job doing (%)
Physical/labor
Office work

Statistical Analyses
While descriptive statistics tell a lot, when it comes to causal relationships they maybe
misleading, or simply cannot go beyond the obvious. As the name suggests descriptive statistics
merely describes what is in hand but when we are interested in determining relationships
between two variables and single out spuriousness out of the link, we need multivariate statistical
analyses.
Before deciding on the final models, regular multiple regression diagnostics for outliers,
non-linearity, heteroskedasticity, and multi-collinearity were completed using appropriate
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procedures.2 Since age and years spent in the organization were highly correlated and thus
created a collineraity problem, age was not included in the analyses due to high collinearity. 3
Table 3 Regression Analysis of Terrorist Activity Index
Model -1
Bivariate

Model -2
Recruitment

Model -3
Full Model

Coefficients

Coefficients

Coefficients

0.38***
(0.06)

0.31***
(0.06)

0.29***
(0.06)

Length of Membership

0.13
(0.28)

-0.01
(0.24)

Curiosity

0.16
(0.1)

0.17
(0.14)

Socialization

0.21
(0.15)

-0.12
(0.18)

Inadequate Supervision

-0.02
(0.01)

-0.03**
(0.01)

Low Income

0.03
(0.1)

-0.06
(0.1)

-0.03**
(0.01)

-0.03**
(0.01)

Explanatory Variables
Sincerity
Control Variables

Separatist
Age

-0.11
(0.08)

Gender (male)

-0.01
(0.05)

Marital Status

-0.21
(0.12)

2

No influential cases were detected in all of the models. Partial regression plots revealed linearity in models. As
mentioned in tables robust standard errors were estimated to correct for heteroskedasticity.
3
In cases when the variance inflation factor (VIF) is less than 10 and/or the tolerance (1/VIF) is larger than .1, no
multi-collinerarity is assumed (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980; Greene, 2003).
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Level of Education

0.34***
(0.14)

Occupational Status

0.86**
(0.31)
-0.01

Ethnicity (Kurdish)
(0.24)
-0.4
Religious Affiliation (Alevi)
(0.24)
-0.04
Economic Status
(0.24)
0.39*
Status (Convicted)
(0.18)
Constant

4.79

-4.04

7.54

(6.17)

(5.41)

(4.04)

N

500

497

492

F

57.25***

49.99***

22.11***

R2

0.77

0.76

0.52

Significance levels based on a one-tailed test: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Results
The cross-sectional data analysis results show that as sincerity increases the level of
violence also increases. Thus, the main alternative hypothesis that whether sincerity affects the
level of terrorist action is retained.
Also the regression analysis shows that the more educated a terrorist is the more intense
the level of violence that she or he would exercise. The results show no significant relationship
between males and females and between singles and married terrorists in terms of level of
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violence.
Another important result is that there is a significant relation between the type of terrorist
group and the level of violence. Separatists are more violent than Leftists or Radical Islamists.
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Chapter 5

Discussion, Implications, & Recommendations

Summary and Discussion of Key Findings
This chapter discusses the major findings of the current research for the terrorist
organizations in Turkey and offers a model that summarizes the attachment to the organization.
A comparison of terrorist groups in Turkey in terms of their recruitment dynamics has shown
some common recruitment and attachment to the organization patterns. Based on the research
results a theoretical explanation using the principles of theory integration is given for the results
of the study. Recommendations and policy implications are mentioned at the end of this chapter.
A Theory of Terrorist Recruitment and Attachment in Turkey
Terrorism can flourish as long as new recruits are added to terrorist organizations.
Therefore, the future of terrorism depends on a successful terrorist recruitment and continuation
of the attachment to the organization. The current study found important correlates for terrorist
recruitment, as well as the process and the decision making of terrorist organizations in
recruitment. Also how the sincerity of the organization members affect their attachment to the
terrorist organization is tested. Before discussing the findings regarding each of the research
questions, a few points should be clarified.
First, the recruitment process of the terrorist organizations is predominantly informal.
Despite the submission of personal information to the terrorist organizations as an indicator of
formal recruitment process, there is no formal cutoff point during acceptance to the organization.

66

Recruitment is a long process that requires consistent commitment to both violent and nonviolent
group activities. After months or years of involvement with the terrorist group an individual is
accepted to the cell house of the terrorist organization.
The second point is the freedom of choice in recruitment. The question of whether
terrorist recruitment is a result of popular and unshakable support for terrorist activities or is an
involuntary choice due to coercive external socioeconomic conditions is the main question here.
The results of this research show that freedom of choice in recruitment thus sincerity should be
accepted as the general rule, because there are many opportunities available to avoid joining the
terrorist organizations. One piece of evidence for such freedom of choice in recruitment can be
derived from the high percentages of mobility among Hezbollah terrorists. Those not
volunteering to join the terrorist groups migrated to the western parts of Turkey from the
Hezbollah and the PKK operating areas in the eastern and southeastern parts of the country
(Ekici, 2006).
Third, without an opportunity to access the terrorist group, an individual cannot become a
terrorist (Silke, 2003). An opportunity for accessing a terrorist organization can occur in two
ways. A terrorist candidate must identify an accessible avenue into the group, or else the terrorist
organization has to make that opportunity available to new members through various ways. If
using the first method, an individual faces several risks and difficulties. First, terrorist groups
almost always operate underground. Therefore, it is difficult to search them out. Second, even if
a candidate can find an avenue to the terrorist organization, he or she risks coming across the
wrong people or security forces. If using the second method, however, the terrorist organization
can use a legal political or social organization to make contact, which is more efficient when the
candidate shares the same ideology with the terrorist group and possesses the desired
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characteristics. Candidate terrorists must demonstrate their commitment to the organization’s
goals and ideology by participating in various illegal activities such as protests.
Implications, Limitations and Future Research
This study used self reports (interviews). Self reports are useful when the researcher
attempts to collect detailed information about individuals and the sociological, psychological,
and environmental factors that affect an individual’s behavior (Thornberry & Krohn, 1994);
however, it is commonly believed that self reports have many flaws, such as under- or overreporting, response falsification, bias-associated recall errors, the testing (interview) effect, and
so on. Having mentioned the general limitations of self reports, the limitations of the data used in
this research need to be considered as well. The interviews contain limited information therefore
the reasons why terrorist organizations preferred certain individuals or what kinds of criteria they
used for recruitment decisions are not precisely known.
One of the concerns of social sciences is generalization. Although current research
collected samples from different regions of Turkey where terrorist groups operate actively, there
are many other locations from which samples can be collected. Similarly, the ability to
generalize the findings of this research to other terrorist groups operating in different countries
needs to be investigated.
Policy Implications
Terrorism is still one of the major challenges the contemporary world faces today.
Governments, policy makers, and other stakeholders have great difficulty identifying effective
legal mechanisms for fighting terrorism, mainly because of uncertainties regarding both the
targets and offenders of terrorist acts.
According to the literature on terrorism, there is no single policy paradigm for

68

counterterrorism. Among the policies offered include hardening potential terrorist targets,
punishing terrorist acts for deterrence, and gathering information regarding terrorists and terrorist
networks through intelligence-based interventions.
However, as mentioned before, due to the limitations of terrorism research, evidencebased policies are rare. For instance, some researchers made comparisons between the GDP
(Gross Domestic Product), the educational level of a country, and the number of terror incidents
or active terrorist groups to identify working policies against terrorism. Despite the fact that
these studies might offer some insight, types of terrorist activity, profiles, and ideologies vary.
Therefore, there is a demand for micro-level studies in order to develop effective policies.
The current research is a micro-level study that attempts to identify effective policies
against main terrorist groups from Turkey. Because terrorists groups vary in their tactics, target
selection, and ideologies, understanding attachment and further preventing recruitment to
terrorist groups is believed to be one of the most effective terrorism prevention methods. To this
end, this study suggests macro-level implementations that can be employed by the government
and micro-level implementations that can be used by law enforcement agencies to prevent
terrorism and terrorist recruitment.
This study suggests two types of policy implementations. The first is to improve
socioeconomic conditions so that people will be less vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, a tactic
that requires the identification of risk groups. The second is to detect terrorists and their
networks, a tactic that requires the use of different types of intelligence and preventive
interventions in the locations that terrorists primarily use for recruitment. The former
implementation is a long-term and large-scale project, whereas the latter one is a short-term,
small-scale project that appears to be more promising. The two are, however, interrelated.
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Simply implementing the second tactic could prevent terrorism, but in the absence of the first
tactic, terrorist groups will likely find other fertile ground in which to flourish.

70

References

Agnew, R. (1985). A Revised Strain Theory of Delinquency. [Journal]. Social Forces, 64(1),
151-167.
Agnew, R. (1987). On 'Testing Structural Strain Theories'. [Article]. Journal of Research in
Crime & Delinquency, 23(4), 281-286.
Agnew, R. (2006). Pressured Into Crime: An Overview of General Strain Theory (1st ed.). Los
Angeles, Calif.: Roxbury Pub. Company.
Agnew, R., & White, H. R. (1992). An Empirical Test of General Strain Theory. Criminology,
30(4), 475-500. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-9125.1992.tb01113.x
Ahmed, M. M. A., & Gunter, M. M. (2000). The Kurdish question and international law : an
analysis of the legal rights of the Kurdish people. Oakton, Va.: Ahmed Foundation for
Kurdish Studies.
Akers, R. L. (2000). Criminological theories : introduction, evaluation, and application. Los
Angeles: Roxbury.
Akers, R. L., & Sellers, C. S. (2009). Criminological theories : introduction, evaluation, and
application (5th ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Amos II, J. W., & Stolfi, R. H. S. (1982). Controlling International Terrorism: Alternatives
Palatable and Unpalatable Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 463, 69-83.
Anderson, E. (2003). The Code of the Streets. In F. T. Cullen & R. Agnew (Eds.),
Criminological theory : past to present : essential readings (2nd ed., pp. 159-170). Los
Angeles, Calif: Roxbury Park.

71

Aras, B., & Tokta, Ş. (2007). Al-Qaida, 'war on terror' and Turkey. [Article]. Third World
Quarterly, 28(5), 1033-1050. doi: 10.1080/01436590701371785
Arinç, K. (2010). Siyasî ve Tarihî Coğrafya Perspektifiyle: Türkiye'nin Terör Sorununun Analizi
ve Jeopolitik- Jeostratejik Açıdan Değerlendirilmesi. (Turkish). [Article]. Analysis of
Turkey's Terror Problem and the Evaluation in Terms of Geopolitical and Geostrategical
Perpectives. (English), 14(2), 1-34.
Armborst, A. (2010). Modelling Terrorism and Political Violence. [Article]. International
Relations, 24(4), 414-432. doi: 10.1177/0047117810385779
Art, R. J., & Richardson, L. (2007). Democracy and counterterrorism : lessons from the past.
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Bal, I., & Laçiner, S. (2001). Challenge of Revolutionary Terrorism to Turkish Democracy,
1960-80. Terrorism and Political Violence, 13, 23-36.
Belsley, D. A., Kuh, E., & Welsch, R. E. (1980). Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential
Data and Sources of Collinearity. New York: Wiley.
Bernard, H. R. (2000). Social research methods : qualitative and quantitative approaches.
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Bernard, T. J. (1990). Twenty years of testing theories: What have we learned and why?
[Article]. Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, 27(4), 325.
Bernard, T. J., & Ritti, R. R. (1990). The Role of Theory in Scientific Research. In K. Kempf
Leonard (Ed.), Measurement Issues in Criminology (pp. xviii, 275 p.). New York:
Springer-Verlag.

72

Bernard, T. J., & Snipes, J. B. (1996). Theoretical Integration in Criminology. In M. H. Tonry
(Ed.), Crime and Justice : A Review of Research. Volume 20 (pp. xi, 440 p.). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Bloom, M. M. (2004/03/09/2004 Annual Meeting, Montreal, Cana). The Causes and
Consequences of Terror and Violence: A Comparison of Sri Lanka and the Palestinians,
Secular versus Religious Forms of Suicide Bombing.
Bohm, R. (1985). Beyond unemployment: Toward a radical solution to the crime problem.
Crime and Social Justice, 21, 213-222.
Bonger, W. (1916). Criminality and Economic Conditions. Boston: Little Brown.
Bursik, R. J. (1988). Social Disorganization and Theories of Crime and Delinquency: Problems
and Prospects. Criminology, 26, 519-552.
Button, S. H. (1995). Turkey Struggles with Kurdish Separatism. Military Review, 75(1), 70-83.
Chomsky, N., & Achcar, G. (2002). Understanding Power: New York.
Cloward, R. A., & Ohlin, L. E. (2003). Delinquency and Opportunity. In F. T. Cullen & R.
Agnew (Eds.), Criminological Theory: Past to Present: Essential Readings (2nd ed., pp.
191-197). Los Angeles, Calif.: Roxbury Park.
Cohen, A. K. (2003). Delinquent Boys. In F. T. Cullen & R. Agnew (Eds.), Criminological
Theory: Past to Present: Essential Readings (2nd ed., pp. 186-190). Los Angeles, Calif.:
Roxbury Park.
Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social Change and Crime Trends. American Sociological
Review, 44, 488-608.
Combs, C. C. (2010). Terrorism in the twenty-first century (6th ed.). Boston: Prentice Hall.

73

Crenshaw, M. (1998). The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a product of strategic
choice. NY: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Crenshaw, M. (Ed.). (1995). Terrorism in Context. University Park: Pennsylvania St. Univ.
Press.
Diamond, L. J., Plattner, M. F., & Brumberg, D. (2003). Islam and democracy in the Middle
East. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Douglas, R. (2010). Must terrorists act for a cause? The motivational requirement in definitions
of terrorism in the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. [Article].
Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 36(2), 295-312. doi: 10.1080/03050718.2010.481400
Ekici, N. (2006). Ethnic terrorism and the case of PKK. Masters, Rutgers, New Jersey.
Elliott, D. S., Huizinga, D., & Ageton, S. S. (1985). Explaining delinquency and drug use.
Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Fanon, F. (1967). Toward the African revolution; political essays. New York,: Monthly Review
Press.
Faria, J. R., G, D., & M, A. (2005). Terror Support and Recruitment. [Article]. Conference
Papers -- International Studies Association, 1-19.
Farrington, D., P. (1986). Age and Crime. In M. H. Tonry & N. Morris (Eds.), Crime and
Justice: An Annual Review of Research (Vol. 7). Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Frey, B., & Luechinger, S. (2002). Decentralization as a Disincentive to Terror. European
Journal of Political Economy, 20, 590-615.
Ganor, B. (2002). Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist another Man's Freedom Fighter?
[Article]. Police Practice & Research, 3(4), 287-304. doi:
10.1080/1561426022000032060

74

Gates, S. (2006). The Organization of Terror: Patterns of Recruitment, Allegiance, and Support
Networks in Terrorist Groups. [Article]. Conference Papers -- International Studies
Association, 1.
Gibbons, D. C. (1994). Talking about crime and criminals : problems and issues in theory
development in criminology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
Gilbert, M. (Cartographer). (2011). The Routledge atlas of British history [1 atlas (214 p )].
Glaser, B. G. (1978). Theoretical sensitivity: advances in the methodology of grounded theory.
Mill Valley, Ca: Sociology Press.
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1968). The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for
qualitative research. London,: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Gottfredson, M. R., & Hirschi, T. (2003). A General Theory of Crime. In F. T. Cullen & R.
Agnew (Eds.), Criminological Theory: Past to Present (2nd ed., pp. 240-252). Los
Angeles, Calif: Roxbury Park.
Greene, W. H. (2003). Econometric Analysis (5th ed.). Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
Grunwald, M. (2001, October 28). Terror's damage: Calculating the devastation, The Washington
Post, p. A12.
Gurr, T. (1970). Why Men Rebel? Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hagan, F. E. (2011). Introduction to criminology : theories, methods, and criminal behavior (7th
ed.). Los Angeles: Sage Publications.
Hakim, C. (1987). Research design : strategies and choices in the design of social research.
London ; Boston: Allen & Unwin.
Hall, K., & Clark, D. S. (2002). The Oxford companion to American law. New York: Oxford
University Press.

75

Hirschi, T. (2003). Social Bond Theory. In F. T. Cullen & R. Agnew (Eds.), Criminological
Theory: Past to Present (2nd ed., pp. 231-239). Los Angeles, Calif: Roxbury Park.
Hoffmann, B. (1998). Inside Terrorism. New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press.
Jenkins, B. M. (2011). Stray dogs and virtual armies : radicalization and recruitment to jihadist
terrorism in the United States since 9/11. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
Kaplan, J. (2011). History and Terrorism (Vol. 98, pp. 101-105): Organisation of American
Historians.
Kassimeris, G. (2008). Playing politics with terrorism : a user's guide. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Kaylan, M. (2005). The Kemalists : Islamic revival and the fate of secular Turkey. Amherst, NY:
Prometheus Books.
Keyman, E. F. (2007). Remaking Turkey : globalization, alternative modernities, and
democracy. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Kirisci, K., & Winrow, G. M. (1997). The Kurdish question and Turkey : an example of a transstate ethnic conflict. London ; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass.
Klein, N. (2005). Terror's Greatest Recruitment Tool. [Article]. Nation, 281(6), 14-14.
Komorzynski, J. v. (1897). Der dritte band von Carl Marx' "Das capital.". Wien etc.
Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content analysis : an introduction to its methodology (2nd ed.).
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.
Laqueur, W. (1999). The Age of Terrorism. Boston: Little, Brown.
Larabee, A. (2011). Why Historians Should Exercise Caution When Using the Word
"Terrorism.". [Article]. Journal of American History, 98(1), 106-110. doi:
10.1093/jahist/jar114

76

Lennings, C. J., Amon, K. L., Brummert, H., & Lennings, N. J. (2010). Grooming for Terror:
The Internet and Young People. [Article]. Psychiatry, Psychology & Law, 17(3), 424437. doi: 10.1080/13218710903566979
Lytle, E. E. (1977). A bibliography of the Kurds, Kurdistan, and the Kurdish question.
Monticello, Ill.: Council of Planning Librarians.
MacDonald, C. G., & O'Leary, C. (2007). Kurdish identity : human rights and political status.
Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
Martin, G. (2003). Understanding terrorism : challenges, perspectives, and issues. Thousand
Oaks: Sage Publications.
Martin, G. (2008). Essentials of terrorism : concepts and controversies. Los Angeles: SAGE
Publications.
Martin, G. (2011). Essentials of terrorism : concepts and controversies (2nd ed.). Los Angeles:
SAGE.
Marx, K. (1887). Capital: a critical analysis of capitalist production. London,: S. Sonnenschein,
Lowrey.
Merton, R. K. (1938). Social Structure and Anomie. In F. T. Cullen & R. Agnew (Eds.),
Criminological Theory: Past to Present: Essential Readings (2nd ed., pp. 178-185). Los
Angeles, Calif.: Roxbury Park.
Merton, R. K. (2003). Social Structure and Anomie. In F. T. Cullen & R. Agnew (Eds.),
Criminological Theory: Past to Present: Essential Readings (2nd ed., pp. 178-185). Los
Angeles, Calif.: Roxbury Park.

77

Messerschmitt, J. W. (2003). Masculinities and Crime. In F. T. Cullen & R. Agnew (Eds.),
Criminological Theory: Past to Present (2nd ed., pp. 430-440). Los Angeles, Calif:
Roxbury Park.
Messner, S. F., & Golden, R. M. (1992). RACIAL INEQUALITY AND RACIALLY
DISAGGREGATED HOMICIDE RATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVE
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS. Criminology, 30(3), 421-447.
Messner, S. F., Krohn, M. D., & Liska, A. E. (1989). Theoretical integration in the study of
deviance and crime : problems and prospects. Albany: State University of New York
Press.
Messner, S. F., & Rosenfeld, R. (2003). Crime and the American Dream. In F. T. Cullen & R.
Agnew (Eds.), Criminological Theory: Past to Present: Essential Readings (2nd ed., pp.
198-207). Los Angeles, Calif.: Roxbury Park.
Miller, D., & Mills, T. (2010). Counterinsurgency and terror expertise: the integration of social
scientists into the war effort. [Article]. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 23(2),
203-221. doi: 10.1080/09557571.2010.481664
Muller, E., & Opp, K.-D. (1986). Rational Chice and Rebellious Collective Action. American
Political Science Review, 80, 471-487.
Nachmias, C., & Nachmias, D. (1996). Research methods in the social sciences (5th ed.). New
York: St. Martin's Press.
Ness, C. D. (2007). Female terrorism and militancy : agency, utility, and organization. Milton
Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
The Turkish Law of Terror Prevention (1991).

78

Olson, M. (1971). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Boston: Harvard University Press.
Palmer, M., & Palmer, P. (2008). Islamic extremism : causes, diversity, and challenges. Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Reckless, W. C. (2003). Containment Theory. In F. T. Cullen & R. Agnew (Eds.),
Criminological Theory: Past to Present (2nd ed., pp. 227-230). Los Angeles, Calif:
Roxbury Park.
Reitan, E. (2010). Defining Terrorism for Public Policy Purposes: The Group-Target Definition.
[Article]. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 7(2), 253-278. doi:
10.1163/174552409x12574076813513
Ross, J. I. (2006). Political terrorism : an interdisciplinary approach. New York: Peter Lang.
Saladino, C. (2008). Identity, Power, and The War on Terror: The U.S., Turkey, and the PKK.
[Article]. Conference Papers -- Midwestern Political Science Association, 1.
Sampson, R. J., & Groves, W. B. (1989). Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social
Disorganization Theory. American Journal of Sociology, 94(4), 774-802.
Sampson, R. J., Raudenbush, S. W., & Earls, F. (2003). Collective Efficacy and Crime. In F. T.
Cullen & R. Agnew (Eds.), Criminological Theory: Past to Present (2nd ed., pp. 118125). Los Angeles, Calif: Roxbury Park.
Sampson, R. J., & Wilson, W. J. (2003). A Theory of Race, Crime and Urban Inequality. In F. T.
Cullen & R. Agnew (Eds.), Criminological Theory: Past to Present (2nd ed., pp. 111117). Los Angeles, Calif: Roxbury Park.
Sandler, T. (2011). New frontiers of terrorism research: An introduction. [Article]. Journal of
Peace Research, 48(3), 279-286. doi: 10.1177/0022343311399131

79

Saul, B. (2005). Definition of "Terrorism" in the UN Security Council: 1985-2004. [Article].
Chinese Journal of International Law, 4(1), 141-166. doi: 10.1093/chinesejil/jmi005
Schelling, T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Shaw, C. R., & McKay, H. D. (2003). Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas. In F. T. Cullen &
R. Agnew (Eds.), Criminological Theory: Past to Present: Essential Readings (2nd ed.,
pp. 104-110). Los Angeles, Calif.: Roxbury Park.
Silke, A. (2003). Becoming a Terrorist. In A. Silke (Ed.), Terrorists, victims and society:
Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences. West Sussex, England:
John Wiley & Sons.
Smith, P. J. (2008). The terrorism ahead : confronting transnational violence in the twenty-first
century. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
Sorel, J.-M. (2003). Some Questions About the Definition of Terrorism and the Fight Against Its
Financing. [Article]. European Journal of International Law, 14(2), 365-378.
Stahl, R. (2006). Have You Played the War on Terror? [Article]. Critical Studies in Media
Communication, 23(2), 112-130. doi: 10.1080/07393180600714489
Taspinar, O. (2005). Kurdish nationalism and political Islam in Turkey : Kemalist identity in
transition. New York: Routledge.
Thornberry, T. P., & Krohn, A. D. (1994). Delinquent peers, beliefs, and delinquent behavior: A
longitudinal test of interactional theory. (Cover story). [Article]. Criminology, 32(1), 47.
Tittle, C. R. (1989). Prospects for Synthetic Theory: A Consideration of Macro-Level
Criminological Activity. In S. F. Messner, M. D. Krohn & A. E. Liska (Eds.), Theoretical
Integration in the Study of Deviance and Crime: Problems and Prospects (pp. 37-51).
Albany: State University of New York Press.

80

Tripathy, J. (2010). What is a terrorist? [Article]. International Journal of Cultural Studies,
13(3), 219-234. doi: 10.1177/1367877909359731
TUIK. (2011). Turkey in Statistics. Ankara: Turkish Statistical Institute.
Law of Terror Prevention, 3713 C.F.R. (1991).
Uslu, E. (2007). From Local Hizbollah to Global Terror: Militant Islam in Turkey. [Article].
Middle East Policy, 14(1), 124-141. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4967.2007.00289.x
Vegh, D. T. (2011). College Students and the Illicit Use of Prescription Drugs: A Test of
General Strain Theory. Ph.D. Dissertation, Northeastern University, Boston,
Massachusetts. Retrieved from
http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.ohiolink.edu:9099/pqdweb?did=2332027691&sid=1&Fmt
=2&clientId=7987&RQT=309&VName=PQD Available from A&I Dissertations &
Theses database. (AAT 3449880)
Vold, G. B., Bernard, T. J., & Snipes, J. B. (2002). Theoretical Criminology (5th ed.). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Wanous, J. P. (1980). Organizational Entry: Recruitment, Selection and Socialization of
Newcomers. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
Ward, C. A. (2003). Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism: The Role of the
United Nations Security Council. Journal of Conflict & Security Law, 8(2), 289-305.
Whittaker, D. J. (2003). The Terrorism Reader. London: Routledge.
Williamson, M. (2009). Terrorism, war and international law : the legality of the use of force
against Afghanistan in 2001. Farnham, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

81

Appendix 1

Questionnaire
1- What is your age?
2- Where were you born?
3- What is your gender?
A – Male

B - Female

4- Your marital status
A – Single

B – Married

C - Divorced

5- What is your level of education?
A - Secondary (lower, incomplete)
B - Secondary
C - Higher (incomplete)
D - Higher
E - Candidate of Sciences
6- Occupation/Profession _____________________________________
7- Occupational category
A – Employed

B - Unemployed

8- What is your ethnicity?
9- How many siblings do you have?
10- How would you describe your family's economic situation?
A- Very Poor

B- Poor

D- Rich

E- Very Rich

C- Average

11- What is your family’s political background?
A- Left wing

B- Right wing close to center

C- Center

D- Left wing close to center

E -Left wing
12- What is your terrorist organization that you were belong to?
A- DHKP/C (Left)

B- Turkish Hezbollah (Right)

C- PKK (Separatist)
13- Do you have any relatives who work in the police or army force?
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A- Yes

B- No

14- Do you have valid passport
A- Yes

B- No

15- Have you ever been abroad?
A- Yes

B- No

16- Can you speak any foreign language?
A- Yes

B- No

17- Do you know how to use a gun?
A- Yes

B- No

18- Where did you get in touch with terrorist organization at first?
A- School
B- Family gathering
C- Religious Compound
D- Prison
E- Political meeting or event
F- Other (Please explain)……………………………………….
19- What was your relation to the person who gets in touch with you at first?
A- Friend
B- Relative
C- Clergy
D- Teacher
E- Other (Please explain)……………………………………….
20- What was the gender of the person who gets in touch with you at first?
A- Male

B- Female

21- What was age of the person who gets in touch with you at first?
22- How did the recruiters contact with you?
A- Individually
B- Newspaper advertisements
C- Internet
D- Friend/relative advice
E -Other (Please explain)……………………………………….
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When did you get in touch with the organization initially?
23- What was your age?
24- Which season
A- Autumn

B- Winter

C- Spring

D- Summer

25- Daytime or nighttime?
A- Day Time

B- Night Time

26. What was the basic reason that causes you to go with terrorist organization?
A- Just curiosity
B- Personal motivations (i.e. ego, sex or the lust for power)
C- Socialization from peers or the organization
D- Inadequate supervision of family
E- Low income
F- Other (Please explain)……………………………………….
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